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Further Misinterpretation of
Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f):
Elevating In Rem Interests and
Promoting the Use of
Property Law to Bankruptcy-Proof
Real Estate Developments
by
George W. Kuney*
In a prior article' I examined the effect of broadly misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code 2 § 363(f) to include "claims" within the statute's word "interest." Specifically, I argued that the interpretation resulted in shifting Chapter
11 from a process focused on confirmation of a plan of reorganization to one
making bankruptcy courts the forum of choice for sales of businesses, troubled
or not, so that purchasers and insiders-not debtors and their creditors-can
benefit. This Article examines a mirror image of that problem: what I argue
is an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of § 363(f) that results in traditional
*Associate Professor of Law and Director of the James L. Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law at
The University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A., 1986, Economics, University of California, Santa
Cruz; J.D., 1989, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; M.B.A., 1997, University of San
Diego; Partner, Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP through 2000. The author thanks Robert R.
Barnes, Donna C. Looper, and Thomas E. Plank for comments during the preparation of this Article, Kevin
M. Howard, Michael L. Penley, Stephanie S. Pierce, and T. Ryan Malone for able research and citationchecking assistance, and Shelley Malphurs for her word processing and consistency services. The author
also thanks Michael J. Pruter, Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP, San Diego, California, and
Dennis Ragsdale, Long, Ragsdale & Waters, P.C., Knoxville, Tennessee, for direction to transactional
documents relevant to modern real estate development practice involving reciprocal easement agreements
and related devices involving nonlien traditional in rem interests that run with the land.
'George W. Kuney, Bankruptcy Code § 363.): A Misinterpretationthat Undermines the Chapter 11
Process,76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 (2002) (hereinafter "Misinterpretations I"). This second article on § 363
issues grew out of a series of intertwined tangents that developed in the drafting of Misinterpretations I.
As a result, this Article cites back to that article in a number of places to avoid needless duplication of
reasoning and authorities found in the last issue of this journal.
2
Throughout this Article, reference is made to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code." Unless otherwise noted, all such references are to Title 11 of the United States Code as in effect September 30, 2002.
Additionally, all citations to "section," "sections," "§ ," or "§§ " are to the Bankruptcy Code and all citations to "Rule" or "Rules" are citations to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure unless otherwise
noted.
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in rem interests that run with the land being excluded from the set of inter
ests that can be stripped off property through a free and clear sale. 3 This
second set of misinterpretations of the statute elevates in rem interests to a
potentially immutable status, creating "bankruptcy-proofing" opportunities
that run counter to the. reorganizational purposes of the Code.
This misinterpretation encourages the creation and use of traditional in
rem interests that run with the land to structure transactions and ongoing
commercial relationships. By using easements, covenants, and liens to address
matters that might otherwise be included in a purchase and sale, joint venture, partnership, or operating agreement, contracting parties may decrease
the risk that the transaction will be unwound or modified in a later bankruptcy proceeding. If this "bankruptcy proofing"4 technique becomes more
widely understood outside of the insolvency community, its use is likely to
increase.
Section I of this Article explores the statutory power to sell free and
clear of traditional in rem interests in the preplan and plan contexts and judi3

This Article is not the first to note this problem or, as this Article does, to contend that the use of
eminent domain may be one of the proceedings that should 'count" for § 363(0(5) purposes. See Basil H.
Mattingly, Sale of Property of the Estate Free and Clear of Restrictions and Covenants in Bankruptcy, 4
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 431 (1996) (hereinafter "Mattingly"). Professor Mattingly's Article predates
some of the authorities discussed in this Article and does not address the bankruptcy-proofing incentives
to use reciprocal easement agreements and similar transactional devices that are created by the dominant
interpretation of § 363(0 to exclude in ren interests. He "argues that section 363(0 itself permits sales
free and clear of restrictions," which he analytically equates with liens, and "that Bankruptcy Code policies
are furthered by this model of section 363(0." This author does not embrace equating restrictive covenants with liens per se, but Professor Mattingly's article is an excellent analysis of § 363(f) issues in this
context.
4
Some may object to the use of this term, arguing that the Code prevents parties from structuring
transactions to avoid application of the Code to them. See, e.g., § 365(b)(2) (upon assumption of executory
contract there is no need to cure a default under an ipsofacto clause); § 541(c) (ipsofacto clause is unenforceable with regard to property becoming property of the estate). However, it is possible to structure
transactions to minimize exposure to bankruptcy risk by focusing on, for example, minimizing the property
rights of a potential debtor by using an escrow or a special purpose entity, drafting charter and bylaw
prohibitions to prohibit or make difficult a voluntary filing, and providing for automatic termination of
rights due solely to the passage of time. See, e.g., Michael D. Fielding, Preventing Voluntary and lnvoluntary Bankruptcy Petitions By Limited Liability Companies, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 51 (2001) (discussing bank,
ruptcy hindrance mechanisms); Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory
Institutionalization of Securitization, 33 CON. L. REv. 199 (2000) (discussing bankruptcyproofing
through asset securitization); George W. Kuney, IntellectualProperty Licenses in Bankruptcy, 16 CEB CAL.
Bus. L. PRACT. 33, 43-46 (Spring 2001) (discussing techniques to minimize bankruptcy risk in intellectual
property license transactions and collecting authorities discussing similar techniques). Because of the judicial exclusion of traditional in rem interests from § 363(0-type 'interests," the use of traditional in rem
interests that run with the land is yet another mechanism to accomplish the same end. Those for whom
"bankruptcy prool" is too strong a term may prefer "bankruptcy resistant." Cf. generally In re Kingston
Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that fashion has a role in bankruptcy as well
as the garment industry and analyzing provisions in corporate documents designed to create bankruptcy
remote entities).
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cial interpretations of those powers.5 The section concludes that the courts

have incorrectly interpreted the statute to exclude traditional in rem interests
that run with the land from the set of interests that may be stripped off
property under § 363(0.6 Section II explores the likely effect of a continuation of the current, dominant interpretation: the increased use of reciprocal
easement agreements7 and other transactional devices that create traditional
in rem interests to bankruptcy-proof' real estate development projects and
related ventures.8 Section III proposes returning to a straightforward interpretation of the statute and using notions of adequate protection and the fair
and equitable cramdown requirement to avoid the problems 9 created by the
misinterpretation of § 363(f) and to alleviate concerns regarding disruption of
important relationships represented by in rem "interests." 10
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING SALES FREE AND
CLEAR OF IN REM INTERESTS WITH AND WITHOUT A
PLAN OF REORGANIZATION
A.

363

1141(c)
12
Bankruptcy Code § 363(0 permits a trustee or debtor in possession
SECTIONS

(F) AND

11

'See infra notes 1-100 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
7
Reciprocal Easement Agreements are commonly referred to as "REAs" and are discussed generally in,
among other places, Marvin Garfinkel's article May all or Portions of a Recorded Shopping Center Reciprocal Easement Agreement Be Rejected as an Executory Contract under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code?,
28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 83 (1983) (hereinafter 'Garfinkel") and Denise L. Savage's article Reciprocal Easement Agreements: Assumption and Rejection in Bankruptcy, 19 REAL EST. LJ. 99 (1990) (hereinafter "Savage"). Both articles predate the Gouveia v. Tazbir opinion discussed infra at notes 43 & 72,84 and
accompanying text, which tends to refocus the analysis of REAs away from § 365 assumption and rejec,
tion issues and on to § 363(f) free and clear issues, but their discussion of the practical, real world use of
REAs remains up to date. This Article uses the terms "reciprocal easement agreement" and "REA" to
denote almost any transactional document or device that uses traditional in rem interests that run with the
land to structure relationships between parcels of land and their owners. See infra note 106.
'See infra notes 101-82 and accompanying text.
9
A clarification of the author's normative stance is in order. Attempts to bankruptcy-proof or create
bankruptcy-resistant transactional structures are not per se evil or problematic. If Congress determines
that some entities or transactions should not be subject to modification under the Bankruptcy Code or a
particular chapter of the Code, that is perfectly appropriate. I classify bankruptcy-proofing as a problem
when it is the product of (mis)interpretation of the statute rather than the legislature's intent. Here, in
particular, there is no evidence that Congress ever intended § 363(0's term "any interest" to exclude some
of the most long-standing property interests in our legal system. Therefore, a body of decisions that does
so is a problem-a normative "bad" to me-that is or will be taken advantage of by sophisticated parties
and their counsel.
'°See infra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
iiThe bankruptcy courts probably no longer have the power to authorize sales of assets free and clear
outside the scope of § 363(f) or the plan process. Supra note 1 Kuney MisinterpretationsI at note 13
("The bankruptcy court may have the power to sell assets free and clear even without the existence of
§ 363() or the plan process." See MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
837 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing, inter alia, to Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931)), for
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to sell property of the estate free and clear of interests in the property if any
one of five conditions is met.' 3 The section provides:
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section free and clear of any interest in such property of
an entity other than the estate, only if (1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all
liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
the proposition that "even absent express statutory authority, the Bankruptcy Court had the inherent
equitable power to sell a debtor's property and to transfer third-party interests to the proceeds of the sale"
and Fierman v. Seward Nat'l Bank, 37 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1930), for the proposition that "[w]hen the
bankrupt's property was sold free of liens, the liens upon the property became rights against the substituted proceeds of sale, and claimants to this fund were obliged to assert their rights by applying to the
court in whose custody it was.- Precedent from the Johns-Manville case, however, is suspect under the
doctrine of "good facts make bad law," see State v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1998) (good facts
form "a comfortable backdrop against which courts relax their vigilance"), and, at a minimum, should
generally be confined to the facts of mass tort cases. Cf Burke v. Deere & Co.,6 F.3d 497, 510 (8th Cir.
1993) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1986)), regarding limiting jury instruction from Johns-Manville to asbestos cases. Further, more recent cases indicate little willingness to acknowledge free-standing equitable powers in the bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington
v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) ("whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must
and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code"); Petro v. Mishler, 276 F.3d 375
(7th Cir. 2002) (section 105(a) could not be used to supplement Chapter 13 confirmation standards as
those were explicitly set by statute). This leads to the conclusion that the present Supreme Court would
be more likely to find that § 363(0 has circumscribed the limits of whatever original, broad equitable
power of sale free and clear may have existed in the bankruptcy courts and that even § 105 (the all writs
provision) can not be used to expand that power. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313-33
(1995) (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting and observing problems with broad injunction issued
under § 105 by non-Article III bankruptcy judge); United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549-50
(1990) (broad equitable powers of § § 105 and 1123(b)(5) are subject to limitation if subject matter has
been addressed by other provisions of the Code or other applicable law); § 363(f) (the sale-free-and-clearsale power may be used "only if" one of five express conditions is met).
2§ 902(5) ("trustee" generally means 'debtor" in Chapter 9 cases); § 1107(a) (granting a Chapter 11
debtor in possession the rights, powers, and duties otherwise provided for the trustee under the Bankruptcy Code); § 1203 (conferring Chapter 12 debtor in possession with many of the rights, functions, and
duties of a chapter 11 debtor in possession); § 1303 (providing a Chapter 13 debtor with the rights and
powers of a trustee under §§ 363(b), (d)-(f), and (1).
i3§ 363(0; Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 1, at notes 13-83 and accompanying text (discussing
the law relating to these five conditions in detail and collecting authorities). See generally Lee R. Bogda
noff, The Purchaseand Sale of Assets in Reorganization Cases-of Interest and Principal,of Principles and
Interests, 47 Bus. LAW. 1367, 1415-25 (1992) (discussing many of the issues involved in the sale of assets
in bankruptcy cases that are beyond the scope of this Article, and noting, at 1371, that although the sale
provisions of the Code present some of its most difficult issues of statutory construction and application,
they have traditionally received little critical analysis).

2002)
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(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable
proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.1 4

Although § 363 can be used to implement a confirmed plan, it can also be
used on a freestanding basis to authorize a preplan sale of property free and
5
clear through a motion to sell.'
The Code also contains provisions that can explicitly render assets free
and clear of claims and interests through the process of plan confirmation,
6
consummation, and postconfirmation vesting:'
Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this
section and except as otherwise provided in the plan or in
the order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan,
the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all
claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and
7
of general partners in the debtor.'
The postconfirmation vesting power can only be invoked under a confirmed
plan.' 8 Section 1141(c)'s vesting free and clear power, which, in at least some
respects, is broader than § 363(f) on its face, has been largely ignored and
remains largely unconstrued. 19
i4§

363(f) (emphasis added).

"5 See Kuney MisinterpretationsI, supra note 1, at note 17 (discussing sale motion practice and relevant
authorities).
i6§ 1123(a)(5) (plan may provide for sale or transfer of property); § 1123(b)(3) (plan may settle or
adjust any claim or interest); § 1123(b)(4) (plan may provide for sale of substantially all of the assets the
estate); § 114 1(c) (allowing postconfirmation vesting of property free and clear of all claims and interests).
When a bankruptcy case is commenced-or, technically, to take account of involuntary bankruptcy cases,
upon the entry of the order for relief- an estate is created and all of the debtor's rights in property pass to
the estate. § 541. If the case is a Chapter 11 case, upon consummation of the confirmed plan the property
is transferred out of the estate and re-vests in the debtor or other entity designated by the plan under
§ 1141(c). A similar provision is found in Chapter 13 cases involving adjustment of debts of an individual
with regular income. See § 1327(c).
17§ 1141(c) (emphasis added). Section 1141(c) complements or enables the portion of § 1123(b) that
allows a plan to contain provisions "for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the estate."
§ 1123(b)(4). Confirmation standards for a plan, including the -cramdown" or nonconsensual confirmation
provisions are found in § 1129.
i8§ 1141(c). This postconfirmation vesting free and clear is independent of the issue of whether a
debtor receives a discharge from prepetition claims. For example, when a debtor liquidates under a confirmed plan, or when the reorganized debtor is not an individual (i.e., is an artificial entity such as a
corporation), it does not receive a discharge. § 1141(d)(3)(A). There is no reason, however, that the
debtor's property that is liquidated under the plan cannot vest with the purchaser free and clear of the
claims and interests of the debtor's creditors, equity security holders and general partners. See §§ 1141(c)
and 1141(d)(3) (section 1141(c) does not specify with whom the property can vest; it leaves that openended. Section 1141(d)(3) specifies only that the debtor is not discharged from claims under certain circumstances; it does not deal with the debtor's or the estate's property or a purchaser of that property).
i"See Kuney MisinterpretationsI, supra note 1 note 28 ('A Chapter 11 case that has a sale free and
clear as its goal will generally proceed straight to a preplan sale before, if ever, engaging in the costly and
time consuming process of proposing, confirming, and consummating a plan of reorganization. In fact, it is
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The term "interest"-the group of things that an asset may be sold or
vested free and clear of-is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, 20 despite
detailed definitions for many other similar foundational terms.2 1 Some have
noted that courts seem to provide an interpretation of "interest" that is

not uncommon for reorganization cases that began with a plan as their goal to end with a preplan sale.
The plan process simply can consume too much time, generate too much expense, or fail to result in a
feasible exit strategy for the debtor. Cf In reAPF, Co., No. 98-01596, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Order Confirming Modified Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of FPA Medical
Management Inc. and Certain of Its Subsidiaries and Affiliates, As Modified (Bankr. D. De. May 27, 1999)
(unpublished decision on file with court, docket no. 2097) (confirmation of plan of reorganization long
continued, finally plan confirmation process converted into § 363 sale with bare minimum of notice; liquidating plan followed). Further, under § 363(m) and current best practice, a sale transaction will close
shortly after court approval and any appeal will be rendered moot, assuming that requisite findings of good
faith were made and no stay of the order is granted prior to the closing. See State v. Shenandoah Realty
Partners, L.P. (In re Shenandoah Realty Partners, L.P.), 248 B.R. 505 (W.D Va. 2000) (discussing standards for stay pending appeal and denying motion for stay); see, e.g., Official Comm. of Senior Unsecured
Creditors of First RepublicBank Corp. v. First RepublicBank Corp., 106 BR. 938, 940 (N.D. Tex. 1989)
(appeal dismissed; sale order entered on December 16, stayed until noon December 19, sale closed on
December 19 at noon, no stay pending appeal obtained: "the dog is dead and the appeal is moot'); FED. R.
BANKR. P. 8002 (orders are final and nonappealable ten days after entry). Section 363(m)of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or
(c) of this section [which are implicated in any 363(0 sale] of a sale or lease of
property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to
an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such
entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale
or lease were stayed pending appeal.
11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2000). See also Hoese Corp. v. Vetter Corp.(In re Vetter Corp.), 724 F.2d 52, 56
(7th Cir. 1983) ("good faith" for § 363(m) purposes requires a showing that there was not "fraud, collusion
between the purchaser and other bidders or the trustee, or an attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of
other bidders"). This provision creates a race to close a transaction as soon after entry of the sale order as
possible to prevent any stay from issuing and to moot potential appeals. See, e.g., In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994,
997-98 (7th Cir. 1986) (sale closed without stay of appeal; appeal was automatically mooted)). See gener,
ally 1 WELL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, REORG,NIZING FAILING BuSINESSES 11-29 to 11-31 (ABA
1998) (describing § 363(m) authorities and practice).
2
See Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. Dematteis/MacGregor, JV, 209 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2000) ('The
term 'any interest' as used in § 363(0 is not defined anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code"); Minstar, Inc. v.
Plastech Research, Inc. (In re Arctic Enter., Inc.), 68 BR. 71, 78-79 (D. Minn. 1986) (construing "interests"
under § 1141(c) to include liens).
2
See, e.g., §§ 101(5) (claim), (10) (creditor), (12) (debt), (15) (entity), (16) (equity security, which
includes "interests of a limited partner in a limited partnership" or warrant or right to purchase, sell or
subscribe, but not to convert, shares of a corporation or limited partnership interests), (17) (equity security
holder), (18) (indenture), (36) (judicial lien), (37) (lien) (a charge against or interest in property to secure
payment or performance), (41) (person), (43) (purchaser), (49) (security), (50) (security agreement), (51)
(security interest), (54) (transfer). This definitional void may have been partially filled by Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979), in which the Court held that the nature and extent of property rights
were to be determined by applicable nonbankrtiptcy law-primarily state law. This may suggest that
"interest" is coextensive with "property rights recognized by applicable non-bankruptcy law." Such an
interpretation is, however, somewhat broader than that applied by the courts.
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MISINTERPRETATION OF SECTION 363(0

broader than mere ownership interests and lien rights; 22 others have noted
that the courts are perhaps unduly restrictive in their interpretation of the
term. 23 Another commentator, synthesizing the holdings of two leading
cases, believes that "the term 'any interest' .. .,refer[s] to obligations that are
24
connected to, or arise from, the property being sold."
B. WHAT PROPERTY INTERESTS ARE 'INTERESTS" UNDER

SECTION 363(F)?
The following sections address the application of § 363(f0 to nonclaim
interests. 25 These interests are divided into equity interests, an assortment
of interests that do not qualify as traditional in rem interests that run with
the land,26 and traditional in rem interests that run with land. The analysis
reveals that the courts have limited the "interests" that § 363(0 can strip off
to exclude traditional in rem interests that run with the land without any
overarching unified theory or legislative guidance for support.
1. Equity Interests
Direct ownership rights, or equity interests, are a type of interest that
falls within the purview of § 363(0.27 They can thus be stripped from property sold under the section. There.is no debate over this notion.
2. Other Interests that Fall Short of Being Traditional In Rem
Property Interests
A state's right to recapture depreciation upon sale or change of use of
22

See Kuney Misinterpretations I, supra note 1; 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 363.06[1] (15th ed.
1997).
23
See Mattingly, supra note 3. Although two recent commentators apparently believe that the Bankruptcy Code's use of the word "interest" means a property right in all cases, Walter W. Miller, Jr. &
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 Hous. L.
REv. 777, 813 (2001), I would argue that the authority that they cite for this proposition can be construed to support a different interpretation. See § 541(a) (property of the estate includes -all legal and
equitable interests of the debtor in property"-inclusion of the phrase "in property" is a limitation on the
phrase "all legal and equitable interests" just as is 'of the debtor"; that would not be necessary if "interest"
was already limited to property interests).
24
Note, When You Can't Sell to Your Customers, Try Selling Your Customers (But not under the
Bankruptcy Code), 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 395, 408-09 (2000) (internal quotations omitted, citing In
re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996) and In re WBQ P'ship, 189 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 251995)).
For a discussion of the application of § 363(0 to liens and claims, particularly successor liability
claims that would otherwise be assertable against a purchaser under applicable nonbankruptcy law, see
Kuney MisinterpretationsI, supra note 1 and authorities cited therein.
26
The term "traditional in rem interests that run with the land" includes easements, real covenants, and
equitable servitudes. See infra note 41.
27
See In re Hickey Prop., Ltd., 181 B.R. 171 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (sale of debtor's equity not
equivalent to sale of assets; secured creditor with collateral interest in the debtor's equities could not
object to sale of debtor's assets as it lacked an interest in those assets); In re Dutch Inn of Orlando, Ltd.,
614 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1980) (minority limited partners lacked standing to object to sale of debtorpartnership's assets).
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property, 28 a debtor's homestead exemption, 29 a spouse's tenancy by the entireties interest,30 a recorded right of first refusal,31 renters' rights to obtain
leases under a rent stabilization law, 32 and a leasing broker's right to a commission when the leased property is later sold to the tenant procured by the
broker 33 have all been characterized as somehow "more" than an unsecured
claim but "less" than a traditional in rem interest than runs with the land and,
thus, have been stripped off as part of a sale free and clear. 34
This is consistent with the overall spirit of § 363, which is to promote

alienability of property of the estate for the maximum price possible, 35regard2

Sin re WBQ P'ship, 189 B.R. 97, 99 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (free and clear sale authorized; state's
right to recapture prior depreciation was an "interest" that could be reduced to a money judgement); In re
P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc., 189 B.R. 90, 95 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (accord).
29
In re Crabtree, 112 B.R. 420, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989).
3
Gerdes v. Gerdes (In re Gerdes), 33 B.R. 860, 870,71 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); but cf. Cmty. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Persky (In re Persky), 134 B.R. 81 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (tenancy by the entireties
interests are not amenable to sale under § 363(h) as a tenancy by the entireties is not an undivided
interest, a free and clear disposition would divest the spouse not only of an ownership interest but also a
survivorship interest; finding that § 363(h) is unconstitutional as it is beyond the scope of the Bankruptcy
Clause of the United States Constitution and stating, at 103-04, "[w]e view section 363(h) as a mechanism for redistribution of wealth, infringing on the rights of third parties who are neither debtors nor
creditors in favor of only creditors of the bankrupt's estate and feel that, under the Takings Clause, such
an action does not meet the 'public use' requirement."); see also Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional
Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 571-72 (1996) (agreeing with the Persky court on the issue of
§ 363(h)'s unconstitutionality).
3 1In re Fleishman, 138 B.R. 641 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
"2Cheslock-Bakker & Assoc., Inc. v. Kremer (In re Downtown Athletic Club), 44 Collier Bankr. Cas.
2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (recognizing that the asserted right to obtain leases was not a 'claim" under the
Code's definition as it was merely a right to seek an equitable remedy, and as such the debtor's confirmation of a plan could not discharge this right, but finding that it was an 'interest" and thus could be stripped
off the property sold by using § 363(f and citing, among others, In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 162 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1996), for the proposition that 'a leasehold is a type of 'interest' that fits within the plain text of
§ 363(f)(4)").
33
C.H.E.G., Inc. v. Millennium Bank, 99 Cal. App. 4th 505, 511 (2002) ("More fundamentally,
CHEG's right to earn a commission on the sale of building A, as set forth in the lease, is an interest that
can be terminated by the bankruptcy court when approving sale of the property").
34
There is a tension between § 363(f) and § 365(h) as applied to leases. Section 363(f), of course,
provides for a sale free and clear of any interest, including a leasehold interest. Under § 365(h), however, a
tenant has the right to maintain occupancy of premises after a debtor/landlord has rejected a lease. There
lies the tension. Can a debtor accomplish complete divestiture of a tenant's rights by selling free and clear
when it could not achieve this same end through rejection of the lease? Compare Precision Indust., Inc. v.
Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC (In re Qualitech Steel Corporation), 2001 U.S. Dist. Lsxis 8328 (S.D. Ind.
2001) (holding that the specific protection given lessees under § 365(h) controlled over the more general
free and clear provisions of § 363(f)), with Cheslock-Bakker & Assoc., Inc. v. Kremer (In re Downtown
Athletic Club), 44 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that § 365(h) applies only if the
debtor retains the property and rejects the lease and § 363(0 applies to a sale free and clear). Resolution
of this split of authority is beyond the scope of this Article.
3
"WBQ P'ship v. Virginia (In re WBQ P'ship), 189 B.R. 97, 108-09 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (discussing
the purposes and objectives of Congress when enacting § 363(0 and stating "the purpose behind the 'freeand-clear' language is to maximize the value of the asset ....The 'free-and-clear' language ... provid[es]
the buyer with what is essentially a fully marketable title"); see also GREGORY M. STEIN, MORTON P.
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less of who else may have an interest in that property,3 6 except as specifically
addressed in its subsections. 37 Courts only seem to cry "foul" when they are
faced with attempts to use § 363 to strip off traditional in rem interests that
run with the land (other than liens).38 When faced with such an attempt,
M. STERN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
FROM CONTRACT TO CLOSING at § 3.06-3.31 (discussing standards for judging marketable title in relation to title policy exceptions for, inter alia, easements and covenants). In furtherance of this purpose and
absent any countervailing policy, § 363(f) should be interpreted so as to promote sales free and clear right
up to the Constitutional limit of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on uncompensated takings. See generally United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982) ("The bankruptcy power is subject to
the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking private property without compensation."); Coan v. Bernier (In re Bernier), 176 B.R. 976 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (extensively discussing scope of Congress's
bankruptcy clause power, finding it to be expansive after reviewing relevant Supreme Court cases, and
quoting Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 518 (1938), to state "Property rights do not
gain any absolute inviolability in the bankruptcy court because created and protected by state law ... [I]f
Congress is acting within its bankruptcy power, it may authorize the bankruptcy court to affect these
property rights, provided the limitations of the due process clause are observed."); In re Creative Mgmt.,
Inc., 141 BR. 173, 177 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) ("The purpose of section 363() ... is to enable a debtor
to liquidate its assets without adversely affecting the rights of creditors .... Thus, to the extent that a
party has an interest in property of the estate, such property can be sold free and clear of that interest,
provided the party is given the same rights in the sale proceeds as it would have in the property sold");
H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977) (C... it is necessary to insure that the interest.., is protected, and that no
erosion forbidden by the Constitution takes place").
6
Plank, supra note 31, at 571-72 (recognizing the expansive spirit of § 363 and concluding that the
statute goes too far and is unconstitutional in that § 363(h) allows sales of nondebtor co-tenant interests
in the absence of the protections of § 363(0's five conditions). See also Julia Patterson Forrester, Bank,
ruptcy Takings, 51 FLA. L. REV. 851, 854 (1999) ('At least some scholars feel that the Takings Clause
does not limit prospective bankruptcy legislation. I disagree. The Takings Clause does limit the power of
Congress to impair the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy, even prospectively, and my purpose in
this article is to explain why.").
37See, e.g., § 363(g) (authorizing sale free and clear of -vested right[s] in the nature of dower or [sic]
courtesy"); § 363(h) (authorizing sale free and clear of interests of'tenant[s] in common, joint tenant[s] by
the entirety" if certain conditions are met); but see In re Churchill Properties, III, LP, 197 B.R. 283 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1996) (where attempted presale rejection of lease of real property was denied because of improper
notice, but sale of real property proceeded, and lease was subsequently rejected, § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) right of
lessee to remain in possession trumped § 363(f) free and clear provision under rule of construction that
specific and later enacted provisions-here § 365(h)-prevail over general, earlier enacted ones-here
§ 363(o); In re Taylor, 198 BR. 142, 165 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (accord); see also supra note 34 concerning
the 3§ 363(0/363(h) debate.
1But see Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 920 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1995) (grounding analysis of what may be sold free and clear of interests in property under
§ 363(f) in whether or not the interest is truly an in rem interest; if it is, the interest can be stripped off),
vacated, 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998). Concerns about the potentially disruptive consequences
of allowing a § 363 sale to strip off an in rem interest that would otherwise run with the land are properly
addressed through the Code's "adequate protection" and "fair and equitable" requirements rather than by
recharacterization of property rights as falling in or out of the definition of "interest." See §§ 361 (adequate protection nonexclusively described), 363(e) (adequate protection for § 363 sales), 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)
(adequate protection through attachment to proceeds for sales free and clear under a plan),
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (indubitable equivalent alternative for cram-down). Sale free and clear of liens is expressly permitted by § 363(f)(3), which seems to imply that "lien" is a subset of "interest" as that term is
used in § 363(f), a conclusion bolstered by § 101's definition of "lien" as a "charge against or interest in
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation."
FISHER, JR. & GAIL
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they constrain the interpretation of the statute to block the sale free and
clear of the in rem interest. 39 This approach stands in marked contrast to the
expansive interpretation of the statute to allow sales free and clear of successor liability claims that would otherwise exist against a purchaser under applicable nonbankruptcy law.4o
3. Traditional In Rem Interests that Run with the Land
Nonbankruptcy law has long treated covenants, easements, and other in
rem interests that are said to "run with the land" 41 as property interests or
interests in property. 42 Although they clearly fall within the widely adopted
' 9See infra notes 41 to 100 and accompanying text.
4

See Kuney MisinterpretationsI, supra note 1 (discussing the subject expansive interpretation).
'"These interests include: real covenants, equitable servitudes, and easements. The most recent Re,
statement has dropped the distinction between a real covenant and an equitable servitude and includes
both those terms within the term 'covenant that runs with the land" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: SERVITUDES

§ 1.4 (2000). Historically, however, a real covenant is a promise about the use of

land that, if certain formalities are complied with, will bind the parties to the agreement and their succes,
sors in title to the land. 20 AM. JUR. 2D, Covenants, Conditions, & Restrictions § 12 (2000). An equitable servitude is similar to a covenant although privity of estate between the covenantor and the
covenantee is not necessary. As a result, an equitable servitude is enforceable only against those with
actual knowledge of it as it fails to meet one or more of the formalities required for enforcement as a real
covenant. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D, Covenants, Conditions, & Restrictions § 43 (2000). An easement is a
nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to
interfere with the uses authorized by the easement. A profit a pendre is an easement that confers the right
to enter and remove timber, minerals, oil, gas, game or other substances from the land. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.3 (2000). Whether or not these in ren interests can be stripped off

using § 363(f) does not affect whether they should be termed interests that -run with the land." The
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY recognizes numerous ways that these interests can be terminated
or modified, see infra note 57 (listing Restatement provisions), and numerous doctrines of similar effect are
recognized by American jurisdictions, see Appendix (collecting authorities). Interpreting § 363(0 to allow
modification or termination of these interests would only add one more doctrine to this already lengthy
list, to be applied in appropriate circumstances.
4
2Stamford v. Vuono, 143 A. 245 (Conn. 1928) (restrictive covenants are in the nature of an easement
and thus constitute an interest in the land upon which they are imposed); see also Adult Group Prop., Ltd.
v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (restrictive covenants create a property right in each
grantee); Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n. v. Frankel, 470 A.2d 813 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
(restrictive covenants or negative easements are property rights in favor of the owner of the dominant
parcel, when government took servient parcel by power of eminent domain, compensation for taking of
property right from owner of dominant parcel was due); Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Invs., Ltd., 734
So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1999) (county required to pay monthly recreational fee assessments for land subject to the
fee and purchased by eminent domain in an inverse condemnation action because the restrictive covenant
was a compensable property right); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 507 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1973) (restriction
on adjacent land was a landowner's property right; landowner entitled to just compensation for violation
of the restriction); Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Glenbrook Patio Home Owners Assn., 933
S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (covenants are property interests subject to condemnation and just
compensation); Meredith v. Washoe County Sch. Dist., 435 P.2d 750 (Nev. 1968) (restrictive covenant is
a property right that, when taken by eminent domain, entitled the party benefitted by the covenant to just
compensation); Raleigh v. Edwards, 71 S.E. 2d 396 (N.C. 1952) (owners of land with negative covenants
running in its favor were entitled to just compensation when those property rights were taken by inverse
condemnation); Store Safe Redlands Assocs. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726 (1996) (water rights and
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common legal definition of "interest," courts routinely hold them not to be
strippable interests for purposes of a § 363(f) sale free and clear.43 A court
may hold these interests to be so ingrained in the asset itself that they simply
44
cannot be separated from it.
This is similar to the line of reasoning that
prevents debtors from cleansing accounts receivable by washing away the
account debtor's defenses to payment through a § 363(o sale and effectively
establishing a buyer of the receivables as a holder in due course without
meeting the UCC's requirements for that status. 45 It also resembles those

cases holding that rights of recoupment are so intrinsic to a particular asset
that they follow assets sold whereas rights of setoff do not.4 6 Like the case-

by-case, result-oriented manipulation of the interpretation of § 363(0 to limit
the group of interests that can be stripped off property, these approaches are
unnecessary. Properly viewed, traditional in rem interests, defenses to payditch

rightof-way could be property rights entitling land owner to just compensation if access was

denied).
43

See, e.g., Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (debtor sought to sell free and clear of

equitable servitude limiting use of property to residential uses; sale free and clear denied; "since the...
landowners cannot be forced to accept money damages in lieu of equitable relief, we conclude that § 363(f)
is inapplicable ... ."); Silverman v. Ankari (In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd.), 196 B.R. 251, 255-56 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (considering sale free and clear of liens and road and drainage easements and holding that sale free
and clear is "not intended to sever easements and other non-monetary property interests that are created
by substantive state law"); In re McConnell, 198 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (reciprocal negative
easement under Virginia law runs with the land and is not amenable to a sale free and clear under
§ 363(0(5)); In re 523 East Fifth Street Hous. Pres. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(attempt to sell property free and clear of restrictive covenant in favor of N.Y.C. limiting use of property
to low income housing; sale free and clear denied).
44See, e.g., Silverman v. Ankari (In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd.), 196 BR. 251, 255-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
("Clearly, 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(f) and Bankruptcy Rule 6004, which refer to the sale of land 'free and clear'
of'interests' are not intended to sever easements and other non-monetary property rights that are created
by substantive
state law.").
45
See Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. Dematteis/MacGregor, JV, 209 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that,
if notice properly alerted parties to consequences of proposed sale, the sale free and clear of accounts
receivable under § 363(0 would cleanse the accounts of previously unasserted rights of setoff but not
previously asserted rights of setoff or rights of recoupment previously asserted or not).
46
1n re Sigman, 270 BR. 858 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001) (recoupment is neither a "claim" nor "debt" that
is dischargeable; creditor need not file proof of claim or object to discharge in order to exercise recoupment
right in spite of discharge injunction); In re Lawrence United Corp., 221 BR. 661, 669 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1998) (recoupment is not a claim and does not "fall under the broadest interpretation of an "interest" in
property"); See also Folger Adam Sec., Inc., 209 F.3d at 266-68 (Stapleton, J, concurring) (urging a bright
line standard: § 363(f) can strip off setoff rights but not rights of recoupment); see generally Lee v.
Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1984) (reviewing development of recoupment doctrine and distinguishing it from setoff); In reB&L Oil, 782 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1986) (similar seminal case). The Lawrence
court's assertion that recoupment is not a claim is questionable, at least semantically. See Shalom L. Kohn,
Recoupment Re-Examined, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J.
353, 355 (1999) (citing Coplay Cement Co. v. Willis &
Paul Group, 983 F.2d 1435, 1440 (7th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that the "origins of recoupment are
in the ancient rules of pleading; recoupment is the ancestor of the compulsory counterclaim and setoff of
the permissive counterclaim."). But see Marley v. United States, 381 F.2d 738, 743 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (holding
that sale free and clear did not cleanse assets of set off rights that had been raised and asserted prior to the
sale). Whether these cases are wrongly decided or not is beyond the scope of this Article.
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ment, and rights of recoupment are property rights, protected by the Fifth
Amendment, and the Code provides mechanisms for addressing them: adequate protection 47 and, in the plan context, the "fair and equitable"
cramdown requirement. 48 Using these standards to protect the holder of an
in rem interest is similar to the minority rule-adopted by the Restatement
as the proper modern rule-that permits owners of estates encumbered by an
easement to unilaterally relocate the easement if the relocated easement provides the benefitted estate with benefits substantially similar to those of the
49
original easement.
Courts, however, protect traditional in rem interests that run with the
land from § 363(f) stripoff using one of two general rationales that effectively
read the in rem interest out of the statute, both of which suffer by comparison to using an adequate protection or fair and equitable standard. First, as
previously noted, the in rem interest can be considered so ingrained in the
property that it cannot be separated or, in a shortcut to the same result, that
the in rem interest at issue is not included in § 363(0's use of the term
"interest."5 0
The second rationale used to protect these in rem interests from § 363(f)
is to claim that, under nonbankruptcy law, neither § 363(f)(1) or (f)(5) is
satisfied. In other words, either there is no procedure available under applicable nonbankruptcy law that allows sales free and clears l or when a benefitted
party seeks to enforce rights under an in rem interest, that party enjoys a
unilateral election between legal and equitable remedies or. a sole right to
equitable remedies.5 2 Both of these approaches to the second rationale are
47§ 363(e) (adequate protection requirement applicable to § 363(f)).
41§ 1129(b) (fair and equitable cram down requirement); seeinfra notes 160,68 & 176-80 and accompanying text regarding application of cram down requirements to holders of in rem interests that are to be
stripped
off under a plan and § 1141(c) vesting free and clear.
45
Soderburg v. Weisel, 687 A.2d 839, 844 (Pa. Super. 1997) (court "may compel relocation of an
easement if that relocation would not substantially interfere with the easement holder's use and enjoyment
of the right of way and it advances .the interests of justice ....ordering relocation is an extraordinary
remedy and should be used sparingly"). The Restatement adopts this minority view as reflective of the
proper modern rule. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. SERVITUDES § 4.8(3) (2000) ("Unless expressly
denied by the terms of an easement ... the owner of the servient estate is entitled to make reasonable
changes in the location or dimensions of an-easement, at the servient owner's expense, to permit normal use
or development of the servient estate, but only if the changes do not (a) significantly lessen the utility of
the easement, (b) increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its use and enjoyment, or (c)
frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created."). See also LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 695 (West
2000) (easement by necessity may be unilaterally relocated); id. at art. 748 (other easements may be
relocated unilaterally); Kline v. Bernardsville Ass'n, Inc., 631 A.2d 1263 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(nonconsensual relocation of easement recognized as extraordinary remedy).
"0See, e.g.,
Silverman v. Ankari (In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd.), 196 B.R. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussed
infra notes 55 to 66 and accompanying text).
"iSee, e.g., In re 523 East Fifth Street Hous. Pres. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1987) (discussed infra at notes 67,71 and accompanying text).
5'See, e.g., Couveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussed infra at notes 72,84 and accompa,

2002)

MISINTERPRETATION OF SECTION 363()

well grounded in the words of the statute. They are, however, often flawed
in application and mixed with the first rationale which reads "in rem interests" out of the statute's coverage. 53 Only passing reference, if any, is made
to determining whether or not it is true that nonbankruptcy law does not
permit the sale free and clear or that a monetary satisfaction could be compelled under the particular facts and applicable nonbankruptcy law. 54 The
two rationales are often muddled together, making it difficult to determine
which, exactly, is at work in a particular case.
For example, in In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd.," the court held that a sale
"free and clear of liens and other interests" had no impact on restrictions of
record that run with the land and that § 363(f) is "not intended to sever
easements and other nonmonetary property interests that are created by substantive state law."5 6 The court went on to state that "absent the consent of
the owner of an easement or the easement being in bona fide dispute, 57 the
nying text). This right to choose the remedy negates the element of 'compulsion" to accept the legal
damages necessary to satisfy § 363(f)(5). See § 363(f)(5) (the creditor or interest holder "could be com,
pelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction"). Use of this rationale is not
limited to case law. In a recent note published by the American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review, a
conclusory analysis is presented that states that a trustee could not sell an internet company's confidential
customer list free and clear of the nonexecutory contractual privacy right (a property right) of the custom,
ers. In this note's analysis, the same leap to conclude that no (f)(5) non-bankruptcy proceeding exists is
made. See Note, supra note 24,'at 421 (dispensing with any potential for sale under § 363(f)(4) in three
short paragraphs by analogizing the personal property privacy right to a covenant running with the land
that the author assumes, always gives the benefitted party the right to insist upon equitable relief under
applicable nonbankruptcy law and ignores the potential for eminent domain takings or other, similar proceedings, although displaying knowledge of Professor Mattingly's article on the subject).
"See, e.g., Silverman v. Ankari (In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd.), 196 BR. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussed
at notes
55-66 and accompanying text).
4
5 See Mattingly, supra note 3, at 449 (discussing Massachusetts statute that in certain circumstances,
allows removal of in ren interest and sole remedy is award of money damages). See, e.g., In re Dundee
Equity Corp., 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 436 (S.D.N.Y. "1992) (in an apparently poorly briefed matter, after
finding that stipulation between owner and tenants created an interest that ran with the land under New
York law, the court finds that the interest cannot be stripped off under § 363(0 as the court is "not aware
of' any provision of New York law that would compel the tenants to accept a money satisfaction in lieu of
performance. Eminent domain or proceedings under the statutes cited in 523 East Fifth Street Housing
Preservation, 79 B.R. 568, are not mentioned.).
"Silverman v. Ankari (In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd.), 196 B.R. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
6
Id. at 255. The quoted language is without citation in the decision and lacks any support in the
statute or its legislative history.
'7It bears pointing out that § 363(f)(4) has the potential to cause much mischief. Especially with
covenants and easements, which are subject to a plethora of equitable rules creating, maintaining, and
destroying them, it may be fairly easy in many cases for a debtor or counsel to come up with a bona fide
dispute after a brief consultation with the Restatement of Property and applicable state law. See RE,
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. SERVITUDES § 2.1 (2000) (creation of servitudes); id. at § 2.2 (intent to
create servitude may be express or implied); id. at § 2.12 (servitude may be implied from prior use); id. at
§ 7.2 (termination on expiration of servitude); id. at 7.3 (modification or extinguishment by release); id. at
§ 7.4 (modification of servitude by abandonment); id. at § 7.5 (termination by merger); id. at § 7.6 (modification or extinguishment by estoppel); id. at § 7.7 (modification or extinguishment by prescription); id. at
§ 7.8 (modification or extinguishment by condemnation); id. at § 7.10 (modification and termination of a
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Bankruptcy Code does not even allow the bankruptcy court to authorize a
sale of the property 'free and clear' of an easement..ss The first quoted language suggests that the court believed easements-traditional in rem interests that run with the land59-were outside the scope of § 363(0's term
"interest." The second quotation, which immediately follows the first in the
opinion, suggests that an easement is within § 363(0's use of the word "interest" but can only be stripped off in a § 363(0 sale when there is consent
((0(2)) or a bona fide dispute ((0)(4)), and excludes consideration of the other
6
§ 363(f) alternative grounds. 0
To further muddle matters, the court "supported" the second quoted
statement with the (itself unsupported) remark that:
Three of the five instances where property may be sold "free
and clear" of an interest will never, by law, apply to an easement. Only consent or dispute, neither of which apply in
this case, would have allowed the Trustee to sell the prop61
erty "free and clear" of the easements.
Apparently counsel had not directed the court's attention to applicable state
law permitting such sales or compelling a party benefitted under an easement
to accept a monetary satisfaction for the interest, although state law of that
sort did exist in New York at the time.62 The Oyster Bay court ultimately
authorized the sale of the debtor's real property free and clear of all liens, but
servitude because of changed conditions); id. at § 7.11 (modification and termination of conservation servi,
tude based upon changed conditions); id. at § 7.12 (modification and termination of affirmative covenants
to pay money or provide services); id. at § 7.13 (modification and termination of servitude held in gross);
id. at § 7.14 (extinguishment of servitude under recording act); id. at § 7.15 (application of recording act to
modification or termination of a servitude); id. at § 7.16 (servitudes not terminable under marketable title
acts, including servitudes "that would be revealed by reasonable inspection or inquiry" and those 'reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the dominant estate"); see also Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex.
1983) (discussing use of parole evidence to cure inadequate description of real property to be burdened by
easement); Wallis v. Luman, 625 P.2d 759, 767 (Wyo. 1981) (discussing so-called "ditch right" and its
transformation into an easement through interpretation of deed after reference to terms of deed, intent of
the parties, the circumstances of the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the condition of the
property); Strahin v. Lantz, 456 S.E. 2d 12, 15 (W. Va. 1995) (loss of easement does not result from mere
non-use but may result from adverse possession, proof of an intent to abandon, or transactional documents); see also Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 505,06 (Wyo. 1994) (discussing standards for abandonment); Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1258-59 (1982)
(suggesting that mere non-use may-and should -terminate servitudes). Alternatively, many of these
doctrines should be examined as supporting potential § 363(f)(1) or (f0(5) grounds to allow sales free and
clear.
5
In reOyster Bay Cove, Ltd., 196 B.R. at 255-56. Once again, this statement is without support.
59
See supra note 41.
6
Of course, (f)(3) applies only to liens by its own terms. See § 363(f)(3).
61196 B.R. at 256 n.9.
62
See, e.g., In re 523 East Fifth Street Hous. Pres. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1987) (discussing statutory provisions allowing nonconsensual removal of covenants and easements and
finding them inapplicable to the governmental agency and property at issue).
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held that the enforcement of a road and drainage easement would not destroy
marketability of title and refused to allow a sale free and clear of that
easement.

63

To make matters worse, the Oyster Bay court's broad pronouncements
regarding the inability of § 363(f) to affect traditional in rem interests that
run with the land were apparently unnecessary. The sale had been proposed
on terms and conditions that expressly stated that the property was being
sold "subject to" inter alia "any covenants, restrictions, and easements of record." 64 In other words, the sale was not even structured to attempt to use
§ 363(0 to strip off the easement in the first place. This should ameliorate
some of the negative effects of the Oyster Bay court's broad and muddled
pronouncements -they are dicta.
By briefly examining whether enforcement of the easement would destroy marketability of title, the Oyster Bay court came very close to employing a doctrine of necessity or relative hardship, i.e., if a sale free and clear of
an interest is not a necessity or not justified when balanced against the harm
to other interested parties from permitting a sale free and clear of the interest, it should not be approved. 65 This analysis could have been easily supported by § 363(e), by noting that the debtor could not adequately protect
those who relied upon the Oyster Bay easement for drainage and a roadway.
The Oyster Bay court, however, did not adopt this route. Rather, it went far
beyond the contract language and, inter alia, broadly pronounced a muddled
per se prohibition on sales free and clear of in rem interests that run with the
land and a prohibition on using any grounds other than (f)(2) or (0(4) to
address sales free and clear of easements. 66 In doing so, the court lost the
opportunity to articulate a flexible rule based upon notions of adequate proBR. at 256.
64196 BR. at 253; see also Grant v. Carr (In re Alamo), 239 BR. 623, 625 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999)
63196

(discussing
the Oyster Bay case's "subject to" terms of sale).
5
Cf. In re C.A.F. Bindery, Inc., 199 BR. 828, 835 (Bankr. 8.D.N.Y. 1996) (the "doctrine of necessity"
permits the court to authorize the payment of prepetition claims prior to confirmation if the debtor can
show that the payment is "critical to the debtor's reorganization"); see also In re Fin. News Network, Inc.,
134 B.R. 732, 735-36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The 'doctrine of necessity' stands for the principle that a
bankruptcy court may allow pre-plan payments of prepetition obligations where such payments are critical
to debtor's reorganization."). The doctrine of necessity arises from the equitable principle necessitas, quod
cogit, defendit or "the necessity is a defense to what necessity compels one to do," see GIBSON'S SUITS IN
CHANCLERY § 40, 42 (Michie 1982), and equity receivership practice. Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F.
Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and its Parameters,73 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1989); Charles J. Tabb,
Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations,65 AM. BANKR. LJ. 75 (1991); cf In re 523
East Fifth Street Hous. Pres. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568, 572 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing
doctrine of relative hardships in the context of restrictive covenants: "the test involves a balancing of
equities. Thus, restrictions would be extinguished if, in weighing the burdens of enforcement on the party
seeking extinguishment against the benefit to the party seeking enforcement, it can be said that the restric,
tion is of no actual and substantial benefit.").
66
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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tection and appropriate compensation for any "taking" at issue and demoted
its promising reference to necessity and balancing of interests to mere dicta
along with its broad pronouncements of the statute's inapplicability to in rem
interests.
An exception to this lack of careful application of the statutory standard
by counsel or the court is In re 523 East Fifth Street Housing Preservation
Development Fund Corporation.67 There the debtor sought authority under
§ 363(f)(1) (applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale) and (f)(5) (interest
holder could be compelled to accept money satisfaction) to sell property in
New York City free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, and covenants. 68
The property at issue was subject to a restrictive covenant running in favor
of the City of New York that required the property to be used only for low
income housing. 69 The court held the covenant could not be extinguished
under the New York statutes governing enforceability of restrictive covenants or under New York common law because the debtor and the city intended the covenant to run with the land and the covenant touched and
concerned the land.70 After a detailed analysis of the New York statutes
regarding extinguishment of restrictive covenants, the court concluded that
the city could not be compelled to accept a monetary satisfaction of its interests. 7 1 In other words, the court threw the substantive controversy back to
nonbankruptcy law under § 363(0(1), engaged in a careful examination of the
6779 B.R. 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
6

Sld. at 570,71.

69

Id. at 569. Specifically, the covenant at issue stated that the property could be used only for low
income housing until its mortgage was paid off. Id. at 570. This was inartful drafting of the covenant in
that any sale of the property, at any time, that paid the mortgage would, it would seem, extinguish the
covenant. In dispensing with the debtor's textual argument that the use restriction could be stripped off
under § 363(0(1) because the proposed sale would pay off the mortgage, the court ignored the practice of
simultaneously closing real estate transactions and insisted on portraying the proposed transaction as a
which-came-first-the-chickenor-the-egg problem:

The flaw in the Debtor's assertion is that the covenant will not be extinguished
until the mortgage is paid. Since twenty years have not passed, the mortgage can
not be paid until the property is sold and the property cannot be sold free and clear
of the covenant unless such sale is permitted by law. Therefore, the Debtor's reli
ance on the clause adds nothing. The issue remains whether the sale free and clear
of the covenant is permitted by law.
Id. Use of this pretzel logic saved the restrictive covenant from being rendered almost wholly illusory, the
result that would have been obtained if one implemented a simultaneous closing and payoff through es
crow that is common in modern real estate practice. See generally Gregory M. Stein et al., A Practical
Guide to Commercial Real Estate Transactions: From Contract to Closing, 266-68 (2001) (discussing
payoff letters and satisfactions of existing mortgages); id. at 279-81 (comparing benefits of table closings
and escrow closings).
7079 B.R. at 571-76.
7

'Id. at 576.
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matter under that law, and reached the correct conclusion. This case, 523
East Fifth Street, is .thus a model decision in terms of its mode of analysis.
Similarly, at least in part, Gouveia v. Tazbir,72 the only federal Court of
Appeals decision directly addressing the issue of whether a debtor or trustee
may sell property free and clear of in rem interests, also illustrates the correct
analysis, this time under the § 363(f)(5) compelled-to-accept-a-money-satisfaction standard. In Gouveia, the landowner decided to build a commercial
music store on property located in a residential subdivision. 7 3 The property
was burdened by a restrictive, reciprocal land covenant prohibiting use of the
land for anything other than residential use.74 The landowner, however,
sought and obtained permission from the city zoning commission for the construction and operation of the music store. 75 Neighbors then filed suit in
state court seeking to enforce the covenant and enjoin the construction of the
store. 76 After a reversal on appeal, the state courts held the covenant was
enforceable. 77 The landowner then instituted a Chapter 11 case and sought
to sell the property free and clear of the restriction. 78 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the bankruptcy and district courts' decisions that § 363(f) did not
permit the sale because, under applicable state law and § 363(f)(5), the interest holders could not be compelled to accept a money satisfaction for their
interest.79
The Gouveia court further found the restriction did not constitute an
executory contract that could be rejected under § 365.80 Although it recognized the dual nature of the restriction as both a contract and a property
right, the circuit court found that the covenant was primarily a property
interest.8 ' "[A]lthough restrictive covenants (such as the one here at issue)
7237 F.3d 295

(7th Cir. 1994).

7"Id. at 297.
74Id.

75Id.
1d.

76

77Id.
78d.

79Id. at 299.
'Id.This is critical. If the restriction was found to be an executory contract, it could be rejected by
the debtor leaving the interest holder with only a general unsecured prepetition claim. § 365(a) (power to
reject executory contract); § 365(g)(1) (effect of rejection is to create a breach of contract claim deemed to
have arisen immediately prepetition). Much of the commentary regarding restrictive covenants and bankruptcy has focused on the potential for rejection as an executory contract. See Garfinkel, supra note 7;
Savage, supra note 7. The import of the Gouveia court's recognition of the dominant property law, rather
than contract law, character of the covenant makes much of this commentary miss its mark. It also con,
tributes to the bankruptcy resistant features of reciprocal easement agreements discussed in this article at

notes 104-50 and accompanying text.
"Gouveia, 37 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994). The court properly looked to state law in making this
determination and cited to Adult Group Prop. v. Imter, 505 N.E. 2d 459, 464 (Ind.Ct. App. 1987), Pulos
v. James, 302 N.E. 2d 768, 771 (Ind. 1973), and Wischmeyer v. Finch, 107 N.E. 2d 661 (Ind. 1952), in
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may contain the characteristics of both a contract and an interest in real
estate, the primary nature of such covenants is not contractual but rather a
82
property interest."
The court followed this finding with a clear, narrow ground for its holding. It held that the covenant was enforceable and the property could not be
sold free of the interest because under applicable state law the benefitted
parties could not be compelled to accept a monetary satisfaction. 83 Thus, the
debtor failed to satisfy the § 363(0(5) condition that could have authorized
the sale free and clear (there was no argument that (0(1) through (0(4) might
apply). On a final ground, the court quite properly rejected the justification
of -necessity" for the sale to serve the goal of reorganization under the Code
based upon § 105's "all writs" authority84
Another appellate court, this time a South Carolina state court, was faced
with the task of interpreting which covenants and restrictions had been
stripped off a parcel of property on Hilton Head Island through a prior
§ 363(f) sale in Marathon Finance Co. v. HHC Liquidation Corp.85 In that
case a plaintiff argued that the covenants and restrictions at issue were not
"interests" in property that could be extinguished in a bankruptcy sale, and,
even if they were, none of the conditions of 11 U.S.C. § 363(0, the statute
authorizing such a sale, had been met. 86 The majority opinion, however, desupport of its decision. By recognizing the "property right" rather than "contract" nature of the restriction, the court rendered obsolete the executory contract analysis that is generally spoken of with regard to
reciprocal easement agreements. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 7; Garfinkel, supra note 7.
S2Gouveia, 37 F.3d at 299. If analyzed as a contract, a reciprocal negative covenant like the one at
issue in the Gouveia case may not constitute an executory contract because there is no affirmative, contractual, unexecuted duty owed by each party to the other. Cf In re Crummie,194 B.R. 230 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1996) (denying creditor's motion to compel assumption or rejection of car contract, holding that the
contracts were not executory and that creditor merely held secured and unsecured claims because no
performance by petitioner remained to be completed on the contracts under the payment or sale options;
petitioner's sole duty was to collect payments). Rather, with reciprocal negative covenants, there is only a
duty on the part of one party to refrain from acting inconsistently with the covenant. This means that
even if treated as a contract, reciprocal negative covenants may not be rejectable under § 365(a). Not so
for more complex arrangements featuring covenants requiring affirmative performances such as the reciprocal easement agreements discussed at notes 104-50 and accompanying text. Those arrangements, if analyzed as contracts, are executory and subject to rejection as affirmative duties will exist on the part of both
the burdened and benefitted parcel owners. If other courts follow Gouveia and recognize covenants and
easements as property interests (and not contract rights), they will be insulated from rejection under
§ 365 and the only remaining issue will be whether they can be stripped off using § 363(0. See generally
Gregory G. Hesse, On the Edge: Impact of Bankruptcy on Deed Restrictions and Executory Interests, 14
AM. BANKR. INST. LJ.20 (March 1995) (discussing, inter alia,
unreported case involving attempt to reject
a possibility of reverter).
337 F.3d at 299.
"'Id. at 300-01. See supra note 11 (discussing limitations on § 105 to augment powers already addressed and circumscribed by the Code).
85483 S.E.2d 757 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
6
1d. at 760.
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clined to address these contentions as they had not been raised below.8 7
Writing separately to concur in part and dissent in part, Judge Cureton
took on the plaintiffs § 363(f) argument directly.88 He first found that the
restrictive covenants at issue fell squarely within § 363(0's use of the term
"interest."8 9 Thus, he (correctly) concluded that all of the "363(f) criteria"or conditions for sale-could possibly apply to authorize a free and clear sale
except for ()(3), which applies only to liens.9o
Then he turned to § 363()(1) with a somewhat cursory analysis that
assumes that restrictive covenants could only be extinguished under applica,
ble state law in the case of "a substantial change in the character of the
neighborhood which would render the covenant valueless to the covenantee
and oppressive to the covenantor." 91 Dismissing (0(2) (consent) and (0)(4)
(bona fide dispute) as factually inapplicable to the case at bar, the judge
turned to (0(5) and found it could not apply because the benefitted party
87

Id.

"ld. at 766-67.
89ld. at 767.
9°Id.
91
Id. In fact, South Carolina law recognizes that covenants can be extinguished in additional ways.
Although the dissent does not address them with any specificity, it does note that, in addition to changed
circumstances, "[real covenants may be extinguished under state law by operation of doctrines similar to
consent, such as modification, release, waiver, estoppel, and acquiescence. Id. at 767 n.6. See generally 20
AM. JUR. 2D Covenant, Conditions and Restrictions §§ 234-250 (1995). Other grounds for extinguishment, such as merger, also exist." Id. at 608 n.6. See also Archambault v. Sprouse, 55 S.E.2d 70, 71-72
(S.C. 1949) ("If there has been unreasonable delay in asserting claims, or if, knowing his rights, a party does
not seasonably avail himself of means at hand for their enforcement, but suffers his adversary to incur
expense or enter into obligations or otherwise change his position, or in any way by inaction lulls suspicion
of his demands to the harm of the other, or, if there has been actual or passive acquiescence in the performance of the act complained of, then equity will ordinarily refuse her aid for the establishment of an admitted right, especially if an injunction is asked. It would be contrary to equity and good conscience to
enforce such rights when a defendant has been led to suppose by the word, silence or conduct of the
plaintiff that there was no objection to his operations. Diligence is an essential prerequisite to equitable
relief of this nature. Quiescence will be a bar when good faith requires vigilance."); Dunlap v. Beaty, 122
S.E.2d 9, 17 (S.C. 1961) ("Since he [the Referee] has held that the covenant as to the 42-foot strip is of no
real benefit to plaintiff, it would appear that she has no standing to enforce same. When the plaintiff
bought this property, she did so for residential purposes. Shortly thereafter she built a large home on it.
She now seeks to remove the restriction as to residential use in connection with which doubtless the
covenant was made. This being true, the covenant as to the 42-foot strip has, so far as the plaintiff is
concerned, lost its purpose, and may not be enforced by her or anyone holding under her. We conclude
that under the concurrent findings of the Referee and Circuit Judge, which we are not warranted in
disturbing, that the covenant in controversy should be extinguished."). See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § § 7.1-7.14 (2000) (discussing various means of terminating or modifying
servitudes, including covenants that run with the land). Perhaps importantly as well, South Carolina
strictly construes covenants, supporting the use of state law in conjunction with the Bankruptcy Code to
sell free and clear of them in the appropriate case. See South Carolina Dept. of Natural Resources v.
McClellanville, 550 S.E.2d 299, 302 (S.C. 2001) ("It is still the settled rule in this jurisdiction that restric-

tions as to the use of real estate should be strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of free use of
the property"; quoting Taylor v. Lindsey, 498 S.E.2d 862, 863-64 (S.C. 1998)).
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could elect to proceed in equity rather than in an action for damages at law
to enforce the interest and, thus, could not be compelled. in a legal or equitable proceeding to accept a money satisfaction.92 The judge did not address
the possibility of eminent domain proceedings or state law action to cancel
the covenant based upon doctrines other than the "substantial change in char93
acter" standard he had announced.
What is notable about each of these cases, whether the clearest or the
most muddled, is the great lengths to which courts will go to protect in rem
interests that run with the land even as they ignore a simple, principled tool
to apply in each case: § 363(e)'s requirement of adequate protection. 94 Confronting a § 363(0 request with § 363(e)'s requirement that interested parties be afforded adequate protection of .their legitimate, legally cognizable
interests in the property that is to be sold would seem to protect each of the
interests at issue by placing the burden on the debtor or trustee, the party
that is to benefit from the sale free and clear, to provide adequate protection
for the interest holders. 95 Meeting this requirement should be sufficient to
92483

S.E.2d at 767.

9

'One could argue that eminent domain is not available to satisfy the (f)(5) condition because it is a
power of the state, not of a private entity, trustee, or debtor in possession. This argument ignores the
erosion of the public purpose limitation on eminent domain. See infra notes 96 & 100 (discussing and
collecting authorities regarding public purpose and other eminent domain standards).
94
1n fairness, the Marathon court did not have the tool of adequate protection as its procedural posture as that case dealt with a postbankruptcy declaratory action to determine which liens and interests
had been stripped off of the parcel of property at issue in the prior § 363(f) sale. In the bankruptcy cases
discussed, § 363(e) applies. That section provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an
entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used,
sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or
condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of
such interest.
§ 363(e). Thus, a court faced with a debtor or trustee's request to sell free and clear of an interest that
meets the requirements of § 363(f) can still be denied or conditioned so as to protect holders of in rem
interests that run with the land. In fact, that result is required. See id. ("shall prohibit or condition").
Although § 363(e)'s adequate protection standard would have been applicable in each of these cases given
that they concerned proceedings under § 363, in a cramdown confirmation of a plan providing for vesting
free and clear of an in rem interest, the fair and equitable requirement of § 1129(b) would apply to the
same effect. See infra notes 154-82 and accompanying text.
9
The potential group of interest holders may be quite large. This is especially true due to the modern
trend, as represented by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, to liberalize the rules applicable to
traditional in rem interests. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OP PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1, comment a ("At the
beginning of the 20th century, four doctrines peculiar to servitudes law constrained landowners in the
creation of servitudes: The horizontal-privity doctrine, the prohibition on creating benefits in gross, the
prohibition on imposing affirmative burdens on fee owners, and the touch-or-concern doctrine. At the end
of the century, little remains of those doctrines, which have gradually been displaced by doctrines that
more specifically target the harms that may be caused by servitudes."). Under the liberalized view, easements and covenants in gross-i.e., where the benefitted party need not be the owner of a related estate in
land-are no longer disfavored, as has historically been the case ...Rather, they enjoy the same status as
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prevent the free and clear sale from constituting an uncompensated Fifth
96
Amendment "taking."
easements appurtenant. See id. ("Instead of presuming, as the old rules did, that servitudes that impose
affirmative burdens, create benefits in gross, or include elements unrelated to the use of particular land are
invalid, this Restatement shifts the burden to the person seeking invalidation to show that, if it is not
otherwise illegal or unconstitutional, the servitude violates public policy"). Thus in rem interests can
easily be imagined that benefit a whole community. See Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1259-60 (1982) ("Private land use planning, which is primarily based
on the utilization of servitudes, affects the lives of many Americans who live in horizontal developments
and condominiums"). This presents many due process issues concerning the ability and need to identify
and potentially give notice to all beneficiaries, as well as to considerations of the rights of future beneficiaries not currently existing vis-i-vis those that presently exist. These due process points are beyond the
scope of this article, but similar issues have been discussed in terms of tort claimants in cases such as In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 198
(4th Cir. 1988), In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 BR. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), In re Fairchild Aircraft
Corp., 184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995), and the like. See Frederick Tung, Taking Future Claims
Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy, 49 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 435 (1999).
96
A sale free and clear of an in rem property interest can be viewed as either a classic, direct taking of
property by the government (acting through the Bankruptcy Code and court), see Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 FLA. L. REV. 851, 891-92 (1999) ("taking one strand of an owners bundle
of property rights can, under some circumstances, violate the Takings Clause"), or a regulatory taking
(viewing the free and clear order as one that, like a restrictive zoning ordinance, prohibits use of the in rem
property interest). See Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (listing
factors for courts to consider in determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred, including the
property interest holder's investment backed expectations).
When property subject to a lien is sold free and clear of that lien, adequate protection of the lienor's
property interest is generally (but not always) accomplished by attachment of the lien to the proceeds of
the sale. S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 56 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5842 ("Most often
adequate protection in connection with a sale free and clear of other interests will be to have those
interests attach to the proceeds of the sale"). In some cases, adequate protection is provided by having the
lien at issue attach to other, substitute collateral that is not proceeds of the lienholder's original collateral.
Resolution Trust Co. v. Swedeland Dev. Group (In re Swedeland Dev. Group), 16 F.3d 552, 564 (3d Cit.
1999) ("Among the ways a debtor may demonstrate the existence of adequate protection is by supplying
the prepetition lender with a new third-party guarantee [sic] or substitute collateral"). Similarly, sale of
property free and clear of another's in rem property interest can be structured to adequately protect that
party's interest, generally by arranging for just compensation or a substituted property interest.
By analogy to the just compensation case law, standards for adequate protection in the form of just
compensation are well established and readily available. The compensation should be just to the estate
and the in rem interest holder. See Searl v. School Dist., 133 U.S. 553 (1890) (compensation should be fair
to the public and the condemnee). It should be money or money's worth, reflecting the value of the
property interest taken as of the date the property interest is stripped off. United States v. New River
Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343-44 (1923) (citing Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S.
299 (1923)). Any delay in payment should be compensated for by allowing interest. See Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (interest required for payment delayed in condemnation proceedings). As to
what form of value should provide the measure, circumstances should indicate the most appropriate to be
market value, measured using comparable sales adjusted to reflect differences between the subject property
interest and the comparable property interest, the income approach to valuation, and replacement cost.
David Schultz, The Price is Right! Property Valuationfor Temporary Takings, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 281,
299 (1998) (discussing just compensation standards for permanent and temporary takings). The court
should determine what award is needed to place the party holding the in rem interest to be stripped off in
as good an objective, financial position as if the sale free and clear did not take place. See Monongahela
Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). Subjective emotional or sentimental values are irrelevant
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Further, even the most principled decisions that carefully consider applicable nonbankruptcy law when considering proposals to sell free and clear
under (f)(1) (applicable state law) and (f)(5) (compulsion to accept money
satisfaction), do not really delve into those issues in much depth. The fault
may lie with counsel briefing these motions to sell and the objections to those
motions.97 Every state has a number of laws and doctrines to terminate or
modify in rem interests that run with the land such as cessation or completion of purpose, end of necessity, merger, adverse possession, prescription,
abandonment, nonuse, innocent purchaser, change in neighborhood character,
incompatible acts, estoppel, waiver, death or dissolution, release (express or
implied), latches, tax sale, and rights of relocation 98 -yet the cases typically
examine only one theory or doctrine or make broad pronouncements about
the ability of the benefitted party to proceed solely in equity and renounce
any money satisfaction offered or ordered. 99 And all of them forget to consider one proceeding in particular: one to obtain just compensation when
there has been a governmental taking under the power of eminent domain. 1 °
to the analysis. Dep. of Transp. v. Metts, 430 S.E. 2d 622, 624 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) ("Sentimental value
must be ignored. Condemnation proceedings are in rem and just compensation must be based upon the
value of the rights taken, without regard to the personality of the owner or his personal relationship to the
property taken" [internal quotations and citations omitted]). Although value controversy continues, there
is a wealth of precedent on which to draw when calculating just compensation as a form of adequate
protection.
97
Courts are not expected to provide independent research regarding issues not raised by counsel, even
if, as a practical matter, they had the time to do so in this age of overburdened dockets and judicial
vacancies. The adversary system, which is very much at the heart of the current bankruptcy system, relies
upon competent counsel doing a thorough job of identifying and briefing relevant issues for the court.
9
8See infra Appendix (collecting authorities on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis for the fifty states,
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands).
99
The Restatement rejects a broad right to proceed solely in equity. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: SERVITUDES § 8.3 ("A servitude may be enforced by any appropriate remedy or combination of
remedies . . . factors that may be considered in determining the availability and appropriate choice of
remedy include the nature and purpose of the servitude, the conduct of the parties, the fairness of the
servitude and the transaction that created it, and the costs and benefits of enforcement to the parties, to
third parties, and to the public"); see also Carollsberg, A Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n v. Anderson,
791 A.2d 54 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002) (collecting cases and examining the majority and restatement views of
the right of an owner of a servient estate to unilaterally relocate an easement benefitting a dominant
estate); MacMeekin v. Low Income Hous. Inst., Inc., 45 P.3d 570 (Ct. App. Wash. 2002) (declining to
adopt Restatement (Third)'s approach to unilateral easement relocation); see supra note 57 (listing sections
of the Restatement providing for modification or termination of servitudes and summarizing the wide
variety of grounds for doing so).
"°The"proceeding" at issue for purposes of § 363(0(5) is not the eminent domain -or actual takingportion of the condemnation process; it is the legal or equitable proceeding to obtain "just compensation"
or to challenge the government's "public purpose" justification for exercise of the eminent domain power.
This distinction is critical to eliminating an argument that could otherwise sidetrack acceptance of the
proceeding as a -legal or equitable proceeding" for purposes of § 363(f)(5). See Thomas E. Plank, The Eire
Doctrine in Bankruptcy (forthcoming 2002-03) (manuscript on file with author; arguing that bankruptcy
proceedings are neither legal nor equitable proceedings, rather they are sui generis in nature -Professor
Plank and others like him would likely argue that the exercise of eminent domain's "taking" power is
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similarly sui generis). Eminent domain is nothing more than the ancient power of the sovereign to take
property which it needs from its subjects. PATRICK J. ROHAN, 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.1
(rev. ed. 2002); See generally DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS (Foundation Press 2002) (discussing and summarizing the United States law of takings and tracing its development
from historical roots to its modern, present day state). Because of the potential for and history of abuse of
the power of eminent domain, the requirement that there be "just compensation" when the sovereign
"takes" property for a "public use" was included in the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights. ROHAN,
supra at §§ 1.2-1.3 (discussing history of eminent domain from its early history, through its development
in England, and to its import and deployment in the United States). Similar requirements are built into
the constitutions or other laws of all fifty states. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (Alabama); ALASKA CONST.
art. 1, § 18 (Alaska); ARK. CONST. art. 1, § 22 (Arkansas); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19 (California); COLO.
CONST. art. 2, § 15 (Colorado); CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (Connecticut); DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (Delaware); FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 6 (Florida); GA. CONST. art. 1, § 3, para. 1 (Georgia); HAW. CONST. art. 1,
§ 20 (Hawaii); IDAHO. CONST. art. I, § 14 (Idaho); IL. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (Illinois); IND. CONST. art. 1,
§ 14 (Indiana); IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 18 (Iowa); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26,513 (Kansas); Ky. CONST. § 13
(Kentucky); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (Louisiana); ME. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (Maine); MD. CONST. DECL. OF
RIGHTS arts. 19 & 24 (Maryland); MAss. CONST. pt. 1 art. 10 (Massachusetts); MICH. CONST. art. 10,
§ 2 (Michigan); MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (Minnesota); Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 17 (Mississippi); Mo.

CONST. art. 1, § 28 (Missouri); Mont. Const. art. 2, § 21 (Montana); NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (Nebraska);
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (Nevada); N.H. CONST. pt. 1 art. 12 (New Hampshire); Opinion of the Justices,
139 N.H. 82, 87 (1994) (despite state constitution's silence on the matter of compensation for a taking,
that document should be interpreted as requiring "just compensation in the event of a taking"); NJ.
CONST. art. 1, para. 20 (New Jersey); N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 20 (New Mexico); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 7

(New York); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (in takings, follow law of land) and N.C. STATS. § 40A-64 (compensation for taking is fair market value) (North Carolina); N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (North Dakota); OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 19 (Ohio); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 23 (Oklahoma); OR. CONST. art. I, § 18 (Oregon); PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 10 (Pennsylvania); R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (Rhode Island); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13
(South Carolina); S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 13 (South Dakota); TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (Tennessee); TEX.
CONST. art. 1, § 17 (Texas); UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 22 (Utah); VT. CONST. ch. I art. 2d (Vermont); VA.
CONST. art. 1, § 11 (Virginia); WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (Washington); W.VA. CONST. art. 3, § 9
(West Virginia); Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (Wisconsin); WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 33 (Wyoming). Actions to

challenge the state's exercise of the power of eminent domain on the basis that the taking is not for a
public purpose or to seek compensation for a taking are unquestionably legal or equitable in nature,
thereby meeting the requirements of § 363(f)(5). Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 709
(1999) (actions to recover compensation for a taking are legal proceedings; § 1983 suit to recover for
uncompensated taking is an action at law); Heller v. South Williamsport Borough, 74 Pa. D. & C. 2d 745,
798 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1976) (the eminent domain proceedings may themselves be reviewed by a court in an
equitable proceeding); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Ft. Worth, 98 S.W. 2d 799 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1936) (accord). An action to seek compensation for a taking resulting from a bankruptcy proceeding is brought in

the Court of Federal Claims. See, e.g., Ultimate Sportsbar, Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 540, 549
(Fed. C. 2001) (denying claim but recognizing that such claims were cognizable and within its
jurisdiction).
But the hypothetical proceeding comes with all its baggage-if a debtor or trustee were to seek to sell
property free and clear of a property interest using the "just compensation" proceeding of a particular
jurisdiction, the burden would be upon the debtor or trustee to show that the taking was for (i) a valid
public purpose and (ii) that the interest holder would receive just compensation.
In terms of item (i), "public use," in the bankruptcy setting this might be recast as "a valid reorganizational purpose" or "a benefit to the estate," both of which fit within the broad, modern, post Hawaii
Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), scope of public use, which is more realistically viewed as
"public advantage" or whatever the legislature could determine to be a public purpose (in its almost
complete discretion). See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See also Matthew P. Harrington, "Public
Use" and the Original Understandingof the So-Called "Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2002)
(asserting that "efforts to find a "public use" limitation on the power of expiration are a relatively recent
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II. THE EFFECT OF UNWARRANTED PROTECTION OF
TRADITIONAL IN REM INTERESTS THAT RUN WITH
THE LAND
As discussed above, these dominant analyses that protect traditional in
rem interests from being stripped off property in sales free and clear are often
superficial and result oriented.lol They too often assume that the interest
cannot be removed under applicable nonbankruptcy law (defeating sale under
§ 363(f)(1)) or that the party benefitted by the in rem interest cannot be
compelled to accept a money judgment in full satisfaction of the interest (defeating sale under § 363(f)(5)). However, outside of bankruptcy, in rem interests that run with the land may often be terminated under state law, such as
when their purpose is no longer being served. 1 2 As a result, in the appropriate case, a sale free and clear should be permitted under § 363(f)(1) or
§ 363(f)(5) if the nonbankruptcy law standard for termination is met. Existing case law also often fails to explain the distinction between these immumisreading of the constitutional history and text."). Extending the holdings of courts finding that elimina,
tion of economic blight is a public purpose to cover reorganization or liquidation of troubled businesses and
possibly granting a fresh start to debtors seems a small extension, if any. See, e.g., City of Urbana v. Paley,
368 N.E.2d 915 (Ill.
1977) (upholding public purpose of taking land to redevelop blighted area as part of
downtown redevelopment scheme); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981) (upholding public purpose of taking land and reconveying it to General Motors for use as a forprofit
business as part of redevelopment program). Interpreting § 363(0(5) as granting the trustee or debtor in
possession standing to assert eminent-domain-like powers with regard to in rem interests that would
otherwise run with the land, subject to eminentdomainlike limitations, is consistent with the Code's
rehabilitative and reorganizational purposes.
In terms of item (ii), "just compensation," in bankruptcy terms, is a question of either "adequate protection" or "fair and equitable" treatment. See § 363(e); § 1129(b)(2); infra notes 178-82 and accompanying
text.
iOiThey lack careful reasoning and a strong foundation. See, e.g., Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295, 299
(7th Cir. 1994) (debtor sought to sell free and clear of equitable servitude limiting use of property to
residential uses; sale free and clear denied); Silverman v. Ankari (In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd.), 196 BR.
251, 255-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (considering sale free and clear of liens and road and drainage easements and
holding that sale free and clear is 'not intended to sever easements and other non-monetary property
interests that are created by substantive state law"); In re McConnell, 198 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1996) (reciprocal negative easement under Virginia law runs with the land and is not amenable to a sale
free and clear under § 363(f)(5)); In re 523 East Fifth Street Hous. Pres. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (attempt to sell property free and clear of restrictive covenant in favor of N.Y.C.
limiting use of property to low income housing; sale free and clear of covenant denied-focused on elements of intent of the parties that covenant run with the land and that covenant "touched and concerned"
the land). This is largely because Congress left the courts without any foundation or guidance on this
issue in the Bankruptcy Code or its legislative history.
'O2See Mattingly, supra note 3, at 447-48 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 564 at 3311
(1994) and discussing doctrine of changed conditions laws in various jurisdictions, including some that
constrain the formerly "benefitted" parties from seeking equitable relief and compelling them to accept a
monetary satisfaction). The doctrine of changed circumstances or changed conditions has historically been
confined in application to covenants and equitable servitudes. Easements, occupying a more exalted status,
were immune to its effects. See also infra Appendix (collecting authorities regarding termination of in tern
interests in United States jurisdictions).
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table interests and others-which are often equally or more important to the
parties involved and equally as longstanding in the eyes of the law. 103 Nonetheless, the state of the law is what it is, and it has important repercussions
arising out of the incentives it creates for structuring transactions.
A.

RECIPROCAL EASEMENT AGREEMENTS AND OTHER MODERN
TRANSACTIONAL DEVICES WILL INCREASINGLY BE USED TO
INSULATE REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS FROM
BANKRUPTCY RISK

Insulating traditional in rem interests that run with the land from
§ 363(f) will have a predictable effect if maintained. Savvy transactional attorneys will seek to insulate as many rights and remedies for their clients
using these immutable interests as possible. This will reduce their clients'
10 4
exposure to the uncertainties of bankruptcy.
A brief example from a land purchase and sale transaction is illustrative.
Consider a transaction in which a seller of real property wishes to give the
buyer-a developer planning on building a multi-use facility-a credit against
the purchase price in exchange for the buyer's promise to convey to seller
two condominiums, 25,000 square feet ofstreet-level retail space, and four
underground parking spaces in the resulting project once it is developed.
There are a number of methods that could be used to document this deal:
The terms could be included in a master purchase and sale agreement, a separate contract to convey in the future could be used with the obligations secured by a lien on the property, or the parties could enter into a partnership,
joint venture, or similar agreement. When analyzed for seller downside risk
potential105 however, each of these mechanisms is inferior to the use of a
reciprocal easement agreement ("REA") or similar devise that creates a pre,
06
sent in rem property interest that runs with the land for the seller.
If any of the contractual methods are used, including the partnership
"'SSee notes 28-34 and accompanying text, listing examples.
° Cf. Sheryl A. Gussett, On the Edge: Bankruptcy Remote Entities in Structured Financings,15-MAR
Am. BANKR. INST. J. 14 (1996) ("Structured financing is designed to separate the credit quality of the
assets upon which the financing is based from the credit and bankruptcy risk of any entity involved in the
financing.").
iOSDownside risk potential" refers to the likely outcome and expected value of the transaction assuming that the project fails. "Seller downside risk potential" then, is the potential value and risk of buyer
failure.
1°61n this Article, the terms "REA" and "reciprocal easement agreements" are used to refer not only to
documents that are so titled but also to all other forms of transactional documents that create obligations
between parcels of land and parties using in rem interests that run with the land such as easements and
covenants. There seem to be an almost infinite variety of titles for such documents, including "Declaration
of Easements, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions," see infra note 114 (Walgreen REA), "Easements
with Covenants and Restrictions Affecting Land," infra note 113 (Wal-Mart REA), and "Construction,
Operation and Reciprocal Easement Agreement," infra note 114 (Park Meadows REA).
14
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agreement, the resulting transactional documents stand a good chance of being construed as, at best, executory contracts in the buyer's subsequent bankruptcy case, 10 7 subject to rejection under § 365, leaving the seller with only a
prepetition claim that may be secured, unsecured, or undersecured.1 °8 Adding a lien in the seller's favor to the transaction improves it only marginally-any outside source of financing or the property's development is likely
to require subordination of the lien as a condition to financing,1° 9 and a
subordinate lien on a half-developed project that is property of the buyer/
developer's bankruptcy estate is tantamount to illusory in terms of the protection that it provides.11o But under the dominant interpretations of
§ 363(0 reviewed above, a non-severable REA or similar document recorded
against the property will not be stripped off the property absent consent or a
bona fide dispute in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. Assuming careful
transactional lawyering when the REA is prepared and recorded,
§ 363(f)(4)'s bona fide dispute ground will not arise, and § 363(f)(2)'s consent
" 7 "While the term 'executory contract' is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, the legislative history
of and case law under section 365 rely on the Countryman definition, i.e., 'contracts on which performance
remains due to some extent on both sides." Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce
and Dot Corn Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts Including Intel,
lectual Property Agreements and Related Issues Under Sections 365(c), 365(e) and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 310 (2000) (internal citations to this well known definition
omitted). Under this definition, a contract that has been fully performed on either side is not executory.
Id. Some courts have held that a contract must be substantially unperformed on both sides to be executory. Id. In determining whether an agreement is an executory contract, courts will typically examine the
unperformed duties and obligations of each party. Id. Partnership agreements have been found to be
executory contracts, see, e.g., In re Cardinal Industries, Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 972 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
(accepting movants' statement that every out of state court to have considered the issue in a published
opinion-six in all-had held that partnership agreements were executory contracts and noting that the
movants had concluded that the Cardinal court had already so concluded, but suggesting that the matter
had not yet been decided), and the case seems especially clear when considering a general partnership, such
as the one postulated in the text of this Article, as opposed to limited partnerships which can feature one
general partner with executory duties and limited partners who are passive and lack substantial executory
duties after funding their investment, such as those at issue in Cardinal Industries. Land sale contracts
have also been found to be executory contracts. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dawson (In re Shaw) 48 B.R. 857
(D.N.M. 1985), but see In re Britton 43 B.R. 605 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (land sale contract was disguised security device, not executory contract). See also David B. Epstein & Steve H. Nickles, The Na,
tional Bankruptcy Review Commission's Section 365 Recommendations and the "Larger Conceptual Issues,"
102 DICK. L. REv. 679 (1998) (discussing National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposal that the
word "executory" be dropped from § 365 and, instead, advocating the notion "that assumption (or election
to perform) is limited to situations in which the debtor would not have any right to the other party's
continued performance if the debtor ceased its performance"); see generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A
Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227 (1989) (discussing Countryman defini,
tion of executory contract and proposing to abolish the requirement of executoriness).
ios§ 365(g) (effect of rejection).
iOgSee, e.g.,
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bus. Dev. Inc., 42 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1994) (Appellant
junior lienholders sold land for a development project in exchange for deeds of trust. The savings and loans,
which financed the project, required subordination of appellants' interests).
"'See, e.g., id. (when fly-in development failed, seller/subordinated lienholders were wiped out).
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is not at issue if the matter is being litigated. Thus the REA and its traditional in rem interests are protected and the transaction is "bankruptcyproofed" in the sense that it remains intact, encumbering the property despite
the buyer/developer's bankruptcy. Further, as REAs in mixed-use developments are the norm in the industry,11 they are likely to be accepted, if not
embraced, by the construction lender in such a project, making their uniform
adoption that much more likely. Finally, as added protection for the seller
and the buyer's source of development financing, the REA can dictate exactly
the form and operation of the development so that the buyer may only deviate from the master plan with the consent of the other interest holders, often
with the proviso that this consent shall not be unreasonably withheld." 12
The following subsections examine REAs and their bankruptcy-proofing
function in greater detail.
1. Reciprocal Easement Agreements
A reciprocal easement agreement or "REA" is an agreement that applies
to multiple parcels of land that are generally part of a single, joint development project or development scheme.13 It is recorded in state or county real
estate records along with deeds and other grants and conveyances of record. 1 4 Reciprocal easement agreements commonly contain affirmative and
restrictive covenants and negative and affirmative easements including cross"'lSee infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.

"l2 See, e.g.,Easements with Covenants and Restrictions Affecting Land, Misc. Book 129, Page 640,
Blount County Register's Office, Tennessee § 6 (1995) (hereinafter the "Wal-Mart REA"; on file with
author, accessible via website as explained below); Construction, Operation and Reciprocal Easement
Agreement, Document 980529-02358, Clark County Recorder's Office, Nevada § 3.1 (1998) (hereinafter
the "Aladdin REA"; on file with author, accessible via website as explained below). The Wal-Mart REA
and the Aladdin REA introduced in this footnote, and the Walgreen REA and the Park Meadows REA
introduced in the next, were selected for this Article because they are useful examples of REAs employed
by businesses with a national scope and manner of doing business-the Wal-Mart REA and the Walgreen
REA-as well as from projects involving a traditional shopping center, the ovular industry incubator for
REAs-the Park Meadows REA-and a complex hotel/casino/theater/parking/power-generation project-the Aladdin REA. Copies of these documents are available from the applicable governmental office
where they are filed or by accessing the author's section of the "faculty" portion of the website of The
University of Tennessee College of Law (www.law.utk.edu). The Aladdin development is currently the
subject of a chapter 11 case pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada (In
re Aladdin Gaming, LLC, case no. 01-20141-rcj, filed September 28, 2001). The author understands that
the Aladdin REA's enforcability, characterization, and degree of bankruptcy resistance has not been and is
unlikely to be the subject of litigation in that case, at least in its present posture. The author is not
involved in the case except as an academic observer.
"'See, e.g., Declaration of Easements, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, Book 1989, Page 1000,
Williamson County Register's Office, Tennessee, 1 (2000) (hereinafter the "Walgreen REA"; on file with
author, accessible via website as explained in note 112); supra note 112 Wal-mart REA at 1-2; Construction, Operation and Reciprocal Easement Agreement, Book 1283, Page 746, Reception Number 9539126,
Douglas County Recorder's Office, Colorado 1 (1995) (hereinafter the "Park Meadows REA"; on file with
author, accessible via website as explained in note 112).
i14Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 1 n.2.
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easement arrangements;1 15 easements to construct, use, or maintain improvements on another parcel;' 1 6 easements pertaining to improvements on the
parcel itself such as lateral support, encroachment, party wall, and access arrangements; 11 7 shared utility or facility arrangements;118 operating covenants
typically requiring businesses to be open certain days and hours,11 9 to use
certain trade names,1 20 and to restrict the sort of business use; 121 and cost
sharing arrangements. 122 Typical cross-easement agreements relate to joint
parking facilities, roadways, and sidewalks contained in a project such as a
mall or a hotel, casino, entertainment complex.123 They are generally coupled
1 24
with affirmative covenants regarding lighting, cleaning, and maintenance.
Joint projects often include joint infrastructure and improvements such as
utility lines and circuits, water, sewer and storm drain systems, joint signage,
and foundational retaining walls.125 All need to be maintained, and covenants to do so coupled with necessary easements are common.' 26 Encroachment and party wall agreements are common; consider a department store
constructed against the balance of a mall with cross-access on multiple
levels.127 All these obligations may be supported by provisions in the REA
that give rise to a lien in the amount of damages or cost of performance that
"Id. at 95-99. See, e.g., Walgreen REA, supra note 113, at § 2.1, Grant of Reciprocal Easements;
Aladdin REA, supra note 112, at 22-39; Park Meadows REA, supra note 113, at 18-22.
116 Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 95-96. See, e.g., Walgreen REA, supra note 113, at § 2.1(b); Aladdin
REA, supra note 112, at § 2.42.5; Wal-Mart REA, supra note 112, at § 7.1; Park Meadows REA, supra
note 113, at 20.
117
Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 95-96. See, e.g., Wal-Mart REA, supra note 112, at § 5.4; id. at § 7;
Aladdin REA, supra note 112, at § 2.8.
11
Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 96. See, e.g., Wal-Mart REA, supra note 112, at § 10.3. Of the four
REA's featured as authorities in this Article, see supra notes 112 & 113 (listing four REAs involved), the
Aladdin REA contains perhaps the most detailed shared utility arrangements in the form of provisions
calling for the construction, operation and maintenance of a power plant. See Aladdin, supra note 112.
1i9See, e.g., Aladdin REA, supra note 112, at 49-56 (provisions detailing use of floor area, first and
second opening dates, permitted uses, limitations on detrimental characteristics, gaming activities and the
like).
iaOSee, e.g., Park Meadows REA, supra note 113, at at 100-01 (providing for Nordstrom and Dillards
to operate stores under those trade names).
i"iGarfinkel, supra note 7, at 98. See, e.g., Walgreen Rea, supra note 113, at § 5.2; id. at § 5.1.
'See, e.g., Walgreen REA, supra note 113, at § 9.2-9.3 (upon failure of one party to cure a breach of
the REA within thirty days of notice of that default, the non-defaulting party can cure the default and
perform the obligation and be reimbursed by the defaulting party for the costs of doing so plus interest and
the nondefaulting party can secure this payment obligation with a lien on the defaulting party's parcel);
Aladdin REA, supra note 112, at § 9.9-9.10 (provisions for self-help cure of maintenance and restoration
defaults and lien to secure payment of expenses of same).
13See, e.g., Aladdin REA, supra note 112, at § 2.2; Wal-Mart, supra note 113, at § 10.1.
124See, e.g., Wal-Mart REA, supra note 112, at § 11.2; Walgreen REA, supra note 113, at § 3.1; id. at
§ 3.2.
i2'See supra note 114.
126 See, e.g., Wal.Mart REA, supra note 112, at § 11.2; see also supra note 114.
i27Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 96.
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encumbers the burdened parcel in favor of the benefitted party or parcel if
128
the obligation is not met and, instead, is performed by some other party.
Individual lease and operating agreements and the rights of mortgagees may
129
be respectively subordinated to the rights conferred in an REA.
REAs are common in the shopping center industry, where, for example,
the anchor store would rather own its store as opposed to leasing it, but
where the center developer wants to ensure that the anchor remains tied to
the rest of the center as if it were a tenant subject to the restrictive use
clauses and joint access and use of common area provisions of a lease. 13°
They are also common in other mixed use projects, including office tower/
residential condominium projects and resorts that include different components such as a hotel/casino/shopping mall/theater/parking complex.13 In
these mixed-use developments, each business segment can be owned and operated by a separate entity whose business background and skills make it
1 32
qualified to conduct that aspect of the project.
Because each business segment is dependent upon the others for support,
use of common areas, attraction of customers and the like, some form of ar' 2 SSee, e.g., Walgreen REA, supra note 113, at § 9.2 (self help provision; after notice and opportunity
to cure default in, inter alia, maintenance provisions, nondefaulting party may cure default at its own
expense and gain right of reimbursement against defaulting party); id. at § 9.3 (affording nondefaulting
party lien recordation rights to secure payment of reimbursement amounts assessed under § 9.3); Aladdin
REA, supra note 112, at § 4.3 (accord). An interesting variation of such a provision would be one that,
instead of merely allowing for recordation of a lien after default and cure by the nondefaulting party,
actually provided that the lien arose automatically upon cure by the nondefaulting party with the priority
of the lien relating back to the priority and date of recording of the REA itself. A provision of that sort
could prime all subsequent liens and interests by functioning much like a deed of trust that secures a standby letter of credit: Until the letter of credit is drawn down, the lien secures an obligation of zero-but
upon a letter of credit draw, the lien "inflates" to secure the amount of the draw, priming other, subsequently recorded interests by shoving them down in the lien stack, potentially to the point where they are
not supported by any value in the collateral. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank N.A. v. Prime Motor Inns, Inc.
(In re Prime Motor Inns), 130 BR. 610 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (postpetition draws on letters of credit secured by
Debtor's property were not subject to automatic stay and would not be enjoined based upon importance
of independence principle). Providing for a lien of this sort in an REA for each party's obligations to the
venture would be a useful mechanism to protect the parties, their expenditures needed to cure defaults by
other parties and the venture itself. This would be especially true in the case of a bankruptcy by one of
the parties: Without such a lien that relates back to a prepetition REA creating mutual obligations that is
not rejectable under 11 U.S.C. § 365, self-help expenditures by the nonbankrupt parties would be mere
unsecured claims against the estate. Although they might be entitled to administrative priority if found to
be "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate," 11 U.S.C. § 503(b), senior secured
status2 for those claims is far preferable, especially in the case of an administratively insolvent estate.
i 9Savage, supra note 7, at 100 n.4.
13iGarfinkel, supra note 7, at 94; id. Savage at 100. See, e.g., Park Meadows REA, supra note 113.
i"iSee, e.g., Aladdin REA, supra note 112. See also Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 1 n.1 (discussing shopping center
partition to create out-parcels and pads for future or ancillary development).
i"2Savage, see supra note 7, at 101 (The goal of the REA is to allow "several owners of land to use the
aggregate land owned by them as a unified, functionally integrated shopping center, thereby enhancing the
individual retailer's opportunities to generate business by collectively providing a more complete retailing
menu for the consumer appetite.").
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rangement is necessary to ensure that the rights, duties, and remedies of all
the participants are spelled out. 133 Although this could take the form of a
partnership, joint venture, or operating agreement, 134 because courts have insulated in rem interests that run with the land, transactional counsel increase
the future stability of these mutually dependent relationships when the par1 5
ties' obligations are cast as a recorded REA. 1
An REA has the same qualities and purposes as traditional easements and
covenants that run with the land. It is a modern transactional device consisting of a set of traditional in rem interests that address the needs of modern
real estate developments. The basic requirements for a real covenant to run
with the land are that it (a) conforms with the statute of frauds, (b) "touches
and concerns" some estate in land, and (c) exhibits an intent of the parties
that the covenant should bind the estate. 1 36 The clearest example of a covenant that "touches and concerns" an estate in land "is one calling for the doing
of a physical thing to the land."13 7 That a typical REA meets these basic
requirements is demonstrated by the discussion and exemplary provisions dis'The Aladdin REA, supra note 112, is over 100 pages long and spells out the joint development and
operations of the resulting hotel/casino multi-use development with reference to additional governing
documents that are incorporated by reference. Similarly, the Park Meadows REA, supra note 113, is over
128 pages long and governs the development and operation of an initially-two-anchor tenant enclosed mall.
The Walgreen REA, supra note 113, and the Wal-Mart REA, supra note 112, are more succinct at
eighteen and thirty-two pages, respectively, reflecting the more limited scope of the arrangements
involved.
4
"'
All of which could be rejected as executory contracts in subsequent bankruptcy cases. See § 365(a);
see, e.g.,
In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984) (approving rejection of partnership agree,
ment and excusing performance of covenant not to compete); In re E.C. Ernst, Inc., 20 B.R. 583, 586
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing potential rejection of joint venture agreement); In re Wilson, 69 B.R.
960, 962-63 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (determining that oil and gas operating agreement was executory and
could be assumed or rejected).
i"'Although the title of a document is not dispositive as to its nature, see 780 LLC v. DiPrima, 611
NW.2d 637, 644 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000), it would not be wise for counsel to continue to title these
agreements "Construction, Operation and Reciprocal Easement Agreement" and the like. See, e.g., Aladdin
REA, supra note 112 (titled consistent with the first quotation in the preceding sentence); Walgreen
REA, supra note 113 (titled "Declaration of Easements, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions"-much
more consistent with the generic titling suggested here to maximize bankruptcy resistance). Rather, consistent with the bankruptcy resistant strategy described in this Article, they should be generically titled
"Reciprocal Easement Agreement" to indicate what they are: indivisible, mutual grants of easements,
covenants and other in rem interests that run with the land which establish an interrelated system of
estates that govern mixed use or joint development projects. Bryan A. Garner, The Redbook A Manual
on Legal Style § 20.1(b) (West 2002) (a contract should "be unmistakable in its meaning, since whenever a
disagreement arises the parties will have a conscious or unconscious incentive to interpret the contract in
their favor. Unlike most documents, contracts can be subjected to willful perversions of meaning. So the
wordings must be so clear that they foreclose frivolous positions about what they mean.").
i"6WILLIAM

B.

STOEBUCK

& DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.14-8.16 (West

2000). See supra notes 113,31 and accompanying text (discussing particular clauses of REAs).
7
13 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 136, at § 8.15.
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cussed above. 138
2. Using REAs to Capitalize on the Misinterpretationof Section
363(")
Most of the prior analysis of the Bankruptcy Code's effect, if any, on an
REA has focused on whether an REA is an executory contract that is subject
to assumption or rejection under § 365.139 This is questionable in light of
the Seventh Circuit's holding in Gouveia v. Tazbir that, although having
some contract characteristics, restrictive covenants are property rights, not
contracts. 140 Unless faced with an REA that is founded upon a lease, 4 1 the
§ 365 approach appears incorrect. The REA represents a collection of easements, covenants and lien provisions that embody the parties' rights and remedies and constitute in rem interests that run with the land."4 2 These are
property interests in a fundamental sense." 43 Therefore, they must be analyzed, like all other interests in real property, under the standards of § 363,
unless they can be severed into multiple agreements and some of these are
then characterized as executory contracts (rather than property rights) that
are subject to separate assumption or rejection. 144 If they are found to be a
nonseverable package of property rights, then the only issue becomes
whether the REA can be stripped off the land using section 363(f). 45 As
this Article has shown, the courts have generally not been persuaded to do so
(although the analysis is often flawed or superficial). Further analysis of the
potential "bankruptcy-proofing" qualities of REAs in the face of § 363(0 motions must largely await courts faced with the innovations of skilled transactional counsel that have recognized the power of the contract versus
property right distinction arising out of the Bankruptcy Code and the courts'
38

1' See supra notes 113-35 and accompanying text. See, e.g., STUART M. SAFT, WEST'S LEGAL FORMS

§

37.10 FORM OF RECIPROCAL EASEMENT AGREEMENT (2002).
13gSee Garfinkel, supra note 7 (the article's analysis may be somewhat flawed by the erroneous conclusion at its note 84 and accompanying text that the term "claim" includes equitable rights that do not give
rise to a right to payment, contrary to the Code's definition of "claim" and the Court's analysis in Ohio v.
Kovacks, 469 U.S. 274 (1985)); id., Savage, supra note 7 (discussing unreported Texas case in which the
Debtor threatened to reject a possibility of reverter in a grant deed. The parties settled before the court
could rule on the propriety of the attempt. Savage assumes that a reciprocal easement agreement is a
contract.).
i4°See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
"'See, e.g., In re Arden & Howe Assoc., Inc., 152 B.R. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993) (restrictive use
covenant in lease unenforcable once lease was rejected).
14'See Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 1994), discussed supra at notes 72-84.
"'This is why they are the subject of their own segment of the restatement. See
(THIRD)OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1-8.
44

RESTATEMENT

i See generally Michael St. James, Slicing and Dicing Executory Contracts, 22 CAL. BANKR. J. 227
(1995) (collecting cases and criticizing loose or misapplied standards for severability such as those of In re
Gardinier, Inc., 50 B.R. 491, 493 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985), rev'd., No. 85,1208-CIV-T-15, rev'd 831 F.2d
974 (11th Cir. 1987)).
14'Or § 1129(b) in conjunction with § 1141(c). See infra notes 154-82 and accompanying text.
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overly narrow interpretation of the term "interest" in the context of § 363(0.
If prior treatment of traditional in rem interests is any indicator, however, the
potential for successful bankruptcy-proofing of real estate developments with
REAs is great indeed.
Once one recognizes that the prevailing interpretation of § 363(f) has
immunized traditional in rem interests from being stripped off in a § 363(0)
sale-and probably under § 1141(c) in the plan context'4 6 -the incentive for
transactional attorneys is obvious. Knowledgeable practitioners will structure real estate transactions to rely upon these interests whenever possible,
assuming that the parties desire to avoid the flexibility and uncertainty that
147
the Bankruptcy Code provides for future restructuring of relationships.
14
8
By elevating
This is already being done in the nonbankruptcy context.
such in rem interests to immutable status under the Bankruptcy Code as well,
REAs will lock down real estate developments in their original forms and
prevent nonconsensual reorganization or modification of the benefits and burdens of the relationship under the Code. In putting this strategy into action,
counsel will likely turn to and expand the use of REAs, and by recording
REAs against parcels as they are assembled or subdivided, both payment and
performance obligations and structures will be rendered largely bankruptcyproof under current law. 149 Of course, this approach would be ineffective if
courts were to interpret REAs as executory contracts susceptible to rejection under § 365 or "interests" subject to strip off under § 363(0 and
§ 1141(c) in appropriate circumstances. To date, however, they have not
done S0.150
146See infra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
147Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing: A Reply to ProfessorSchwarcz, 52
L. REV. 55 (1999) (discussing, inter alia, the use of securitization to judgment proof companies);
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationalityof Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999) (discussing, inter alia, the use of the proceeds of securitization as dividends to equity holders in order to accomplish
judgment proofing of a company); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L. J. 1 (1996)
(discussing judgment proofing).
4SSee, e.g., Sofran Peachtree City, LLC v. Peachtree City Holdings, LLC, 550 S.E.2d 429, 431-33 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting reciprocal easement agreement as a covenant running with the land and
refusing to allow current owner and other interested parties from avoiding enforcement of nobuild covenant in face of opposition by prior, benefitted owner).
1491 do not mean to suggest that the use of an REA structure will cause payment obligations to be met
during a bankruptcy case involving one of the REA parties. This may or may not be the case depending
upon, inter alia, the particular structure at issue, the need for adequate protection payments, and the
availability of funds. The "bankruptcy-proofing" accomplished by a unitary, integrated REA governing
adjoining parcels of property is the sort that prevents the relative rights of the parties from being stripped
off or restructured either through a Bankruptcy Code process such as a § 363(0 sale, a § 365(a) rejection,
or a § 1129(b) cramdown.
"'Oddly enough, the reverence that the courts show for traditional in rem interests that run with the
land thus creates an incentive for transactional attorneys to embrace a system of ordering social and
business relationships that, while once pervasive, has been in decline for centuries. A mixed use development held together with a series of REAs and in rem interests that run with the land bears strong
STAN.
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3. Other TransactionalDevices are Subject to the Same Analysis
REAs may be the in rem transactional device of choice in commercial
mixed-use real estate projects, but they are by no means the only such devices. Other examples are residential community covenants, codes, and restrictions ("CC&Rs")' 5' and conservation 15 2 or environmental' 1 easements.
These and other modern assemblages of in rem interests are subject to the
same analysis and same conclusions regarding their bankruptcy-proof nature
resemblance to the feudal estate system in which a chain of burdened and benefitted parcels and estates
comprised the source of duties and revenue in a chain from peasant to king that provided the basic social
order. See George W. Liebmann, The Modernization of Zoning: Enabling Act Revision as a Means to
Reform, 23 URB. LAW. 1, 3-4 (1991) (arguing that Prof. Bernard Siegan's deregulation approach to zoning
laws would lead to modernized feudalism via enforcement of private restrictive covenants); see generally
Cornelius J. Moynihan & Sheldon F. Kurtz, Introduction to the Law of Real Property 1-32 (3d ed. 2002)
(describing the estate system imposed in England in the Norman Conquest after the Battle of Hastings in
1066).
isiCC&Rs are commonly the documents that govern what can and cannot take place in a residential
development. See Diamond Bar Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 330 (1976) (interpreting
CC&Rs and provisions allowing for modification or cancellation of various CC&R provisions, demonstrating that drafters of CC&Rs desired to provide more flexibility and potential for change than might be
provided for in otherwise governing law concerning modification of in rem interests). See generally Wayne
S. Hyatt, Symposium: Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 303 (1998) (discussing the evolution and future of community associations and noting that, with
regard to the governance and impact of these associations the "response from scholars and thoughtful
practitioners, however, has not kept pace with the acceleration ... the subject has not received the depth
of coverage in a fully informed manner that is required to assure that the legal evolution will keep pace
with the practical evolution.").
1i2A conservation easement is one that is recorded against a tract of land and which governs its future
development. See CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE GUIDE: LITIGATION AND TRANSACTIONS § 240.12
(Mathew Bender 2000) ("A conservation easement is any limitation in a deed, will, or other instrument in
the form of an easement, restriction, covenant, or condition, executed by or on behalf of the owner of the
land subject to the easement, binding on successive owners of the land, and for the purpose of retaining
land predominantly in its natural, scenic, historical, agricultural, forested, or openspace condition [Civ.
Code § § 815.1]. A conservation easement is an interest in real property of perpetual duration that is
voluntarily created and freely transferable in whole or in part for the purposes mentioned above [Civ.
Code § § 815.2]. All interests not transferred or conveyed by the instrument creating the easement
remain in the grantor, including the right to engage in all uses of the land not affected by the easement or
not prohibited by law or by the easement [Civ. Code § § 815.4] ....A conservation easement may be
acquired and held only by (1) a taxexempt nonprofit organization [see generally I.R.C. § § 501(c)(3)
(income tax exemption)] qualified to do business in California and having as its primary purpose the
preservation, protection, or enhancement of land in its natural, scenic, historical, agricultural, forested, or
open-space condition, or (2) the state, any city, county, city and county, district, or other state or local
governmental entity, if that entity is otherwise authorized to acquire and hold title to real property and if
the conservation easement is voluntarily conveyed [Civ. Code § § 815.3]"). See, e.g., Friends of
Shawangunks v. Knowlton, 64 N.Y.2d 387 (1985) (discussing conservation easement on 240 acres of land
that limited development to one single family house, a water storage pond, and maintenance of an existing
golf course).
iSsAn environmental easement is, generally speaking, a negative easement that limits or prohibits certain
activities on the land in order to control development and maintain open space. 4 POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 34A.08 ("States are Developing Environmental Easements in Order to Restrict More Intensive Use of Remediated or Recycled Properties"); see, e.g., Village of Ridgewood v. The Bolger Foundation,
517 A.2d 135 (NJ. 1986) (discussing perpetual conservation easement to foster and preserve open space).
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as REAs and show just how wide the impact of the dominant interpretations
of § 363(f) insulating in rem interests may be.
B.

CAN A CRAM-DOWN CONFIRMATION AFFECT TRADITIONAL IN
REM INTERESTS WHEN A SALE FREE AND CLEAR CANNOT?

There is no direct case law concerning extinguishment or modification of
in rem interests through a § 1129(b)(2)(A) cramdown plan confirmation followed by § 1141(c) vesting free and clear of the interest in question. 154 The
cases that come close to addressing the issue are those involving an attempted
sale free and clear under § 363(f(5) based upon a hypothetical cramdown
under 1129(b)(2)(a) 155 or those involving modification of contractual cove,
nants and substantive terms within a mortgage or note, such as due-on-sale
clauses and prepetition penalties.i 56 The bare statute itself provides little
guidance.
Courts have, however, allowed substantial modification of lien-holders'
rights through cramdown. For example, courts have confirmed plans that
allow debtors to extinguish due-on-sale clauses,15 7 modify notes to include a
thirty-day cure period for monetary defaults, and limit or eliminate nonmonetary defaults unrelated to collateral to eliminate prepayment penalties, default
58
interest, late payment charges, and reporting requirements.1
Although most courts appear to take a flexible approach in determining
whether the cramdown provisions are satisfied under proposed plans of reoriS4Cramdown is the colloquial expression for confirming a plan that has not been accepted by all
classes of creditors as required for consensual confirmation under § 1129(a). A nonexclusive list of the
standards for cramdown is found in § 1129(b). See also infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
issSee Kuney, Misinterpretations 1,supra note 1, at notes 66-73 and accompanying text (discussing this
theory and citing, as examples, inter alia, In re Perroncello, 170 B.R. 189, 191 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) ("the
'tools' provided by Congress to accomplish that end are valuation proceedings under § 506(a) and cramdown ... under § 1129(b)(2)"); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Red Oak Farms, Inc. (In re Red Oak Farms, Inc.),
36 B.R. 856, 858-59 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (finding that indubitable equivalent would not be realized
and, thus, declining to approve sale), and Scherer v. Fed. Nat'l Mfg. Assoc. (In re Terrace Chalet Apts.,
Ltd.), 159 BR. 821 (N.D. IIl. 1993) (authorizing sale free and clear of lien based upon hypothetical
cramdown)).
16See infra notes 157 & 158 and accompanying text.
117See.g., In re Coastal Equities, Inc., 33 B.R. 898, 905 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) ("a dueonsale clause
is not something so sacrosanct that it is immune from modification in a bankruptcy setting"). The Coastal
Equities court did not comment on what might be so sacrosanct.
15SSee, e.g., In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 75 B.R. 580 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987). In the spirit
of Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198 (1983), the Western Real Estate Fund court stated that these modifications
did not individually nor collectively rise to a level of deprivation of the creditor's lien securing its claim.
The court also failed to demark the outer boundary of permitted "modification." An example of a case
where the court held the borrower had attempted to go too far is In re P.J. Keating Co., 168 B.R. 464, 473
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1994). There, the court refused to confirm a plan of reorganization that struck from a
lender's loan documents a prohibition on stock redemptions while the loan remained outstanding. In the
court's view, requiring a lender to "sit back and do nothing" as its borrower redeems stock with money
which could have been used to pay the lender "is hardly fair and equitable." Arguably it also violates the
absolute priority rule.
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ganization, the substantive changes to lien rights that have been permitted do
not include termination.' 5 9 Instead, they focus on modification of contract
provisions and rights which underlie liens. Combined with the case law concerning liens rather than other interests, complete elimination of an in rem
interest using § 1129(b) appears unlikely at first blush. 16° Careful analysis
reveals otherwise, however.
In analyzing the matter under § 1129(b) itself, the Code's failure to define
the word "interest" again rears its (ugly) head.' 61 While a party benefitted
by an in rem interest holds a property interest in a debtor's property, the
party is also likely to be a "creditor" as defined by the Code as well. If, under
applicable nonbankruptcy law, the interest holder has a prepetition contingent claim for future noncompliance with the terms of the property interest
that can be converted into a right to payment-in other words, a right to sue
' 9This is not surprising. The cramdown statute itself generally favors retention of the lien. Section
1129(b)(2)(A)'s three alternative formulations for the minimum fair and equitable treatment for a class of
secured claims are:
With respect to a class or secured claims, the plan provides(i) (I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims,
whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim
deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a
value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's
interest in the estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is
subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such
liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on
proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or

(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such
claims.
§ 1129(b)(2). The first is incompatible with termination because the lien must be retained.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I). The second is incompatible with termination because the lien must survive to be
transferred to the proceeds of the sale of the collateral. § 1 129(b)(2)(A)(ii). Only the third, the inscrutable indubitable equivalent standard, § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), would seem to apply. Given this Article's focus
on adequate protection and the fair and equitable cram-down standard as tools to temper unreasonable
application of § 363(0's sale free and clear power, it is worth noting that the Code's definition of adequate
protection, like the fair and equitable standard for secured claims, contains a third, catchall alternative,
"indubitable equivalence." See § 361(3)(adequate protection may be provided by the court "granting such
other relief ... as will result in the realization ... of the indubitable equivalent of such party's interest").
See generally MICHAEL A. GERBER, BuSINEss REORGANIZATIONS, 730,31 (2000) (discussion of origin of

indubitable equivalence in Judge Learned Hand's Murel Holding Co. opinion and later decisions dealing
with the concept). The parallel nature of these two standards reinforces their usefulness as twin protec,
tions or limitations on the sale free and clear power.
6
Although lack of support has not stopped development of various doctrines and practices in the
field of bankruptcy law. See, e.g., Kuney, Misinterpretations I supra note 1 (discussing expansive interpretation of § 363(0's term "interest" to include "claims" with little or no support in the statute or legislative
history).
i6iSee supra notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text.
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for money damages if denied the right to exercise the in rem interest-then
the interest-holder is also a creditor, and probably an unsecured creditor at
that.1 62 Section 1129(b) addresses itself to unsecured claims and interests as
part of its statement of the absolute priority rule. 163 In order to cram down a
plan over the objection of a class of unsecured creditors, 164 one of two requirements must be met. Either:
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class
receive or retain on account of such claim property of a
162See § 101(5) (definition of "claim"); § 101(10)(defifiition of creditor). Note that it is not important
for purposes of determining if the interest holder is a creditor whether the interest holder can be compelled
to accept a money satisfaction of the interest, a question that affects the analysis under § 363(f)(5).
Rather, as long as the interest holder has the option of seeking a monetary satisfaction for nonperformance,
he holds a claim and is a creditor. Without more, the claim would be an unsecured claim. However,
conceivably, the in rem interest could be coupled with a lien-upon-default provision, in which case the
interest-holder would be a secured creditor. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing lien
provision securing performance and payment obligations under the Aladdin REA and exploring springing
lien provisions in REAs for failure of the burdened parcel to perform obligations that are later performed
by the benefitted parcel or its owner).
163§1 129(b)(2)(B),(C). If the creditor is a secured creditor, then the standards of § 1129(b)(2)(A)
would apply and the creditor would either have to (i) retain the lien on the property in question and
receive full payment of its secured claim over time, with appropriate interest, (ii) receive a lein on the
proceeds of any sale of the collateral, or (iii) receive the indubitable equivalent of the claim. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i),(ii).
64
1 1t is important to distinguish between the interest holder's interest in the estate's property, which
gives rise to creditor status, and an interest that the interest holder could hold in the debtor itself. The
two are quite different, and holding an interest in the property does not make one an interest holder in the
debtor. See In re Hickey Props., Ltd., 181 B.R. 171 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (creditor holding security interest
in substantially all of debtor's assets could not exercise credit bid right at sale of debtor's equity inter,
ests-sale of the equity interests was not the same as sale of the assets themselves). However, even if it
did, essentially the same cramdown requirement would be applicable tothe creditor as an interest holder. In
order to cram down a plan over the objections of a class of interest holders, one of two requirements must
be met:
(i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class receive or
retain on account of such interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the
plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any fixed liquidation preference
to which such holder is entitled, any fixed redemption price to which such holder is
entitled, or the value of such interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such class will not
receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior interest any property.
§ 1129(b)(2)(C). Properly understood, this section addresses itself to those traditionally considered to be
interest holders: stockholders, partners, and other equity holders. But even if the interest holder/creditor
is viewed as a pure interest holder, removing the superfluous text (for these in rem purposes) regarding
liquidation preferences from the statute, then, in order to cram down a plan on a class of holders of in rem
interests, the plan would only have to provide them (i) with the present value of their interest or (ii) less
than that value-even zero-and no distributions to junior classes. This is exactly the same formulation
applicable to interest holders viewed as unsecured creditors. Compare § 1129(b)(2)(B) (minimum fair and
equitable treatment for unsecured creditors facing cramdown) with § 1129(b)(2)(C) (minimum fair and
equitable standard for interest holders facing cramdown).
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value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the
claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan
165
on account of such interest any property.

Thus, cramdown requires either (i) providing interest holders with the present value of their claim/interest, which can include providing them with a
note providing for deferred principal payments with appropriate interest over
time or (ii) less than that value-even zero-and no distributions to junior
classes. Coupled with § 1141(c), which provides for postconfirmation vesting of property pursuant to the plan free and clear of "all claims and interests
166
of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the debtor,"
cramdown may provide an avenue for stripping off in rem interests in a Chapter 11 case.
Cramdown under alternative (i)-by providing the holder of an in rem
interest with the present value of that interestI 67 -is simply a matter of
providing just compensation for what may be viewed as the government's
taking of that interest through the bankruptcy reorganization process, a public use.1 68 But cramdown under alternative (ii)-payment of less than the
full present value of the claim and providing no distribution to junior classes-runs smack into the Constitutional prohibition on takings without just
compensation. If cramdown is to be accomplished by giving the holder of an
in rem interest less than the present value of that interest, a taking without
just compensation is what is being proposed and the fact that junior classes of
interest holders receive nothing under the absolute priority rule is no salve
for this uncompensated injury.1 69 There are two alternatives in such a circumstance: either confirmation must be denied by the bankruptcy court
upon objection by the interest holder or the interest holder may proceed in
the appropriate court with a "takings" claim against the United States. 17°
165§

1129(b)(2)(B).

166§ 1141(c).
7
16 The difficulty of valuation of in rem interests should not be minimized. However, there is a large

body of law that is beyond the scope of this Article on which to draw in this regard. See generally DAVID
A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 169-90 (Foundation Press 2002) (providing
overview of just compensation standards and noting, at 185-87, that "[o]ne of the most analytically difficult issues in determining just compensation arises when the government takes property where the title is

divided among two or more persons or includes legal restrictions on the use of the property ...
[T]he issue
*..
arises when the property has restrictions on use built into the title ... through easements or servitudes
government must therefore pay the fair market value of the thing acquired, not the value of the
various bundles of rigts that have been taken from the previous owners.").
16iSee supra note 100 (discussing eminent domain and liberally construed public use standard).
l'79See id.
1 See supra note 100 (discussing compensation claim jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims and the
Ultimate Sports Bar case).
...The
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POST-CONFIRMATION VESTING FREE AND CLEAR OF COVENANTS
UNDER SECTION

1141(C)

The case law and commentary on postconfirmation plan property being
received free and clear of covenants that run with the land and other traditional in rem interests under § 1141(c) is sparse to nonexistent. 17 1 Courts
faced with the issue of § 1141(c) vesting do not need to attribute the same
meaning to "interest" as they attribute to the term under § 363(0.172 All
that is clear from the case law is that a lien is an "interest" within the mean,
ing of § 1141(c) and may be stripped off by vesting property free and clear
under a confirmed plan, at least if the lienholder "participates" in the reorganization. 173 There is a lack of authority on whether traditional in rem interests
17

'A review of applicable case law discloses little other than cases involving vesting free and clear of
liens which, despite the holding of In re Bowen, infra, note 172, has been held valid in the case of mortgage
liens, see, e.g., Simon v. Tip Top Credit Union (In re Simon), 1996 U.S. App. Lexis 8733 (10th Cit. 1996)
(unpublished opinion), and has withstood a Tenth Amendment sovereign immunity challenge in the case of
vesting free and clear of the portion of state tax liens securing penalties, fees, and costs (but not the basic
tax due), see Bondholder Committee v. Williamson Cty, Tn. (In re Brentwood Outpatient, Ltd.), 43 F.3d
256 (6th Cit. 1994). See also Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Regional Building Sys., Inc. (In re Regional
Building Sys., Inc.), 254 F.3d 528, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting challenge to vesting free and clear of a
lien based upon § 1327(c)-the Chapter 13 analog to § 1141(c)-precedent and stating "The bankruptcy
court properly determined that all of the elements needed to invoke § § 1141(c)'s 'free and clear of all
claims' language had been satisfied in this case. First, RBS submitted a Chapter 11 reorganization plan to
the court. Second, the plan was confirmed by an order of the court, without any objection from Universal.
Third, the property to which Universal now seeks to attach its lien was 'dealt with by the plan.' Specifically, the plan stated that after certain other claims had been paid, Universal and the other unsecured
creditors would receive a pro rata share of the remainder of the estate, including any amounts left in the $
5 million settlement fund. And fourth, neither the plan nor the order confirming the plan preserved
Universal's lien rights. Rather, the plan classified Universal as a general unsecured creditor. By the plain
terms of § 1141(c), therefore, confirmation of RBS's Chapter 11 plan rendered the $ 5 million settlement
fund 'free and clear of all claims' not expressly preserved. Since Universal's lien was not preserved, it was
extinguished by operation of law upon confirmation of RBS' plan. And we note that every other circuit
court of appeals to have addressed this issue has reached the same conclusion. See Matter of Penrod, 50
F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that under § § 1141(c), "unless the plan of reorganization, or the
order confirming the plan, says that a lien is preserved, it is extinguished by the confirmation."); In re BeMac Transport Co., 83 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 1996) (following Penrod); In re Barton Indus., Inc., 104 F.3d
1241 (10th Cir. 1997) (same)).
il2This potential for inconsistency is consistent with the Code. See § 102(8) ("a definition, contained
in a section of this title that refers to another section of this title does not, for the purpose of such
reference, affect the meaning of a term used in such other section"). One case demonstrating the use of the
term "interest" in § 1141(c) in a manner inconsistent with its use in § 363(0, where it includes a lien,
§ 101(37) ("lien" means charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance
of an obligation); § 363(f)(3) (condition of sale free and clear of an interest that is a lien), is Bowen v. I.R.S.
(In re Bowen), 174 B.R. 840 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) (finding that a lien cannot be released pursuant to
§ 1141(c) because, inter alia, a lien is not an interest, and citing in support Relihan v. Exchange Bank, 69
B.R. 122 (S.D. Ga. 1985) and "a long line of cases beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Long v.
Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886)," and holding that any release of a lien must occur via § 506(d)).
17sSee Matter of Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 563 (7th Cir. 1994) (§ 1141 (c) must cover liens); Dever v.
I.R.S. (In re Dever), 164 BR. 132 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) ("interests" includes "liens"). See supra notes 8892. The Seventh Circuit appears to have originated or revived the "participation" requirement as an
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that run with the land are included in the word "interest" as used in
§ 1141(c), but for the reasons discussed in this article's analysis of the question under § 363(f), the answer should be yes.
Applying the § 1141(c) lien precedents to in rem interests running with
the land, however, is likely to prove difficult. Looking to § 363(f) cases involving nonlien interests, courts will likely be inclined to view these interests
as sacrosanct and to immunize them from proposed extinguishment through
§ 1141(c) vesting free and clear. This need not be the case, however. Section 1141(c) itself expressly refers to vesting property free and clear of "all
claims and interests," indicating an even more unlimited free and clear vesting
power than that of § 363(f, which, on its face, only refers to sale free and
clear of interests, not claimsY 74 Although § 1141(c) limits the claims and
interests that can be stripped from property through postconfirmation vesting to those held by "creditors, equity security holders, and ... general partadditional gloss to Bankruptcy Code § 1141(c). That circuit requires that "before a lien will be deemed
extinguished, not only must it [the property or claim] be dealt with in the plan, but the creditor must have

'participated in the reorganization.'" 8

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

para. 1141.04[1] (citing F.D.I.C. v.

Union Entities (In re Be-Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994), in which the court agreed
with Collier on this point and described § 1141(c) as a "default rule" for secured creditors who file claims
for which provision is made in the plan of reorganization for the extinguishing of the claim). Id. It is
unclear what that final phrase means, but it indicates something more than simply being on the service list
and receiving service of pleadings. Filing a proof of claim, voting to accept or reject a plan, or objecting to
plan confirmation probably qualifies. Under this formulation, if the lienholder does not participate in the
reorganization, its lien would not be dealt with properly in the plan, § 1141(c) would not apply, and the
lien will pass through the bankruptcy unaffected. Id.On the other hand, if a secured creditor has participated in the reorganization, e.g., by filing a proof of claim, then the creditor must remain vigilant to
§ 1141(c) provisions in the plan that could otherwise wipe out or modify the lien. Assumedly similar rules
would apply to nonlien in rem interests as well.
This inconsistent use of identical terms under the same statute and inclusion of an additional requirement for invoking § 1141(c) is probably due to the varying context in which the question arises. Plans
typically include a boilerplate vesting provision which states that, on the effective date of the plan, all
estate property revests in the reorganized debtor free and clear of all claims and interests except as otherwise explicitly provided for in the plan. A secured creditor may not object to the plan prior to confirmation, only to be shown the postconfirmation vesting provision when attempting to enforce the lien
postpetition. If the court is convinced that the debtor has somehow "pulled a fast one" using plan boilerplate, the court is more likely to assist the victimized creditor in wriggling out of the prodebtor result
mandated by strict statutory interpretation. It is these creative efforts to do justice that create bad
precedent.
Such cases are ones in which the courts should consider issuing decisions that are not for publication
and can not be cited under the local rules. Some have, however, questioned the constitutionality of such
local rules and procedures. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated on grant
of rehearing en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cit. 2000); but see Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1158-59
(9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the Anastasoff rationale). If that view is correct, then the courts should reject
the creative approach and interpret the statute literally, creating good precedent and raising the issue to a
level where the practicing bar and Congress can deal with the effects of the statute directly.
174§ 1141(c). See Kuney, Misinterpretations I,
supra note 1 (discussing and collecting authorities examining both § 363(0 and § 1141(c) vesting free and clear issues).
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ners in the debtor,"l75 the first of these categories will generally apply in the
context of in rem interests. 176 This would also constrain the free and clear
7
power within even the most narrow constitutional limits.' 7
Questioning whether to interpret § 1141(c) as allowing vesting free and
clear launches courts on a course of muddled reasoning that has led to the
overly narrow and conclusory analysis of § 363(f) to exclude in rem interests
from its free and clear sweep. As with this § 363(f) issue, the question is
better considered in terms of what standard should be applied before property
is vested free and clear rather than whether it can be so vested at all.
In § 363(f)'s case, the answer lies in the principled application of
§ 363(e)'s adequate protection standard to avoid a Fifth Amendment taking.
For § 1141(c), the answer lies in § 1129(b)'s "fair and equitable" cramdown
standard. 178 In judging whether cramdown is fair and equitable, the effects of
property vesting free and clear of the interest holder's interest must be taken
into account. 179 Assuming the interest holder is separately classified,' 80 and
175 1d. This nicely dovetails with § 363(f)(5)'s requirement that interests be stripped in a sale only if
the party holding the interest could be compelled to accept a money satisfaction. Because the Code defines
a "creditor" as one holding a "claim"; while claim is defined broadly, it does not include a "right to an
equitable remedy for breach or performance if such breach" does not "give rise to a right to payment."
§ 101(5)(B). Equitable rights that do not also give rise to a legal claim are generally not affected by the
Bankruptcy Code and ride through bankruptcy unaffected. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
176See supra note 161-62 and accompanying text (discussing an interest holder in property's status as a
creditor of the debtor).
77
1 See Plank, supra note 31 (finding that Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4 (the bankruptcy clause) of the
United States Constitution limits Congress to legislating on the subject of bankruptcies to adjusting the
relative rights of debtors and creditors and that when it goes beyond this scope, Congress acts unconstitutionally); Forrester, supra note 37 (asserting that the takings clause limits Congress's power under the
bankruptcy clause).
178See § 1129(b)(2). The fair and equitable standard is broader that just the statutory statement of
the minimum treatment to be afforded dissenting classes of secure creditors, unsecured creditors, and
interestholders found in § 1129(b)(2). In re Manion, 127 B.R. 887, 890 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991) (citing In
re D & F Construction, Inc., 865 F.2d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 1989), and stating "Technical compliance with
all the requirements in § 1129(b)(2) does not ensure that the plan is 'fair and equitable' .....
A court must
consider the entire plan in the context of the rights of the creditors under state law and the particular facts
and circumstances when determining whether a plan is 'fair and equitable'.").
179See In re Manion, 127 B.R. 887 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991).
"' 0Like the claims of secured creditors, the interests of in rem interest holders should generally be
separately classified as each such interest is likely to be unique. See § 1122(a) ("a plan may place a claim or
an interest in a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or
interest of such class"). The exception to this general rule would be those interests that inure to the
identical benefit of a number of entities or parcels, in which case, like secured creditors holding individual
fractionalized interests in a single undivided secured claim, the interest holders could be classified together.
See id.; In re Okura & Co., 249 B.R. 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing participations, interbank loans,
and syndications and their relative effects on the direct and indirect creditors rights in bankruptcy vis-a-vis
the debtor and each other, collecting cases, and citing W.H. Knight, Jr., Loan Participation Agreements:
Catching Up With Contract Law, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. RaV. 587, 592 (1987) and Billie J. Ellis Jr. et al.,
"Easy Street" or "Risky Business"? - Why Loan ParticipantsCan't Afford To Be Passive Investors, SC78
A.L.I..A.B.A. 547 (1998)).
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objects to confirmation, 81 then only by providing the interest holder with
the present value of its interest, which should equal the amount of its soonto-be-non-contingent claim for deprivation of its in rem interest, can the plan
be confirmed without creating an uncompensated taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. Applying this fair and equitable standard provides the
plan proponent with great flexibility to address the propriety of postconfirmation vesting free and clear. Dealing with these issues in the plan context
avoids the tortured or confused analysis attendant to the use of § 363(f).182
Similarly, interpretation of § 363(0 in the case of in rem interests can be
simplified by focusing on the adequate protection standard of § 363(e).
III. A PROPOSAL FOR REVERTING TO A
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND STEP-BY-STEP ANALYSIS
ROOTED IN THE STATUTE AND APPLICABLE
NONBANKRUPTCY LAW
Reverting to a straightforward interpretation of the statutes involved
and focusing on standards for approval rather than the absolute scope of the
sale and vesting free and clear power provides a principled way to avoid the
unintended and sometimes muddled deification of in rem interests and development of yet another form of bankruptcy-proofing that is not expressly authorized by statute. Courts should recognize that the word "interest" as used
in §§ 363(0, 1122, 1123(a)(2)-(3), 1129(b), and 1141(c) is a broad term that
should be consistently interpreted across the Bankruptcy Code.' s3 Further,
they should recognize that the term includes traditional in rem interests that
run with the land. Requests to sell free and clear of traditional in rem interests should be analyzed first in terms of the specific grounds under § 363(f)
that may apply. Although consent ((0(2)) and bona fide dispute ((0(4)) are
often recognized, enablement under applicable state law ((0(1)) and compulsion to accept a monetary satisfaction ((0(5)) are too often ignored l8 4 or as"'iAssuming adequate notice, failure to object will be deemed consent to the vesting and other provisions of the plan. See Andersen v. UNIPACNEBHELP (In re Andersen), 179 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1999)
(failure of creditor to object to Chapter 13 plan that provided that student loan debt was dischargable as
an undue hardship constituted waiver of right to object to the discharge of claim for repayment of student
loan). This stands in marked contrast to a sale free and clear under § 363(0(1), where actual affirmative
expressions of consent are required. See In re Roberts, 249 B.R. 152, 153 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000) ("the
consent required by Section 363(0(2) [footnote omitted] may not be implied from the lienholder's failure
to object. The lienholder must actually give its assent"). The difference in the standard for consent can be
justified by the time generally required by the sale-by-motion procedure (very little) versus the plan confirmation2 process (typically involving multiple hearings, multiple mailings of notice, and lots of time).
" See supra notes 41-100 and accompanying text.
i"'But cf § 102(8) ("a definition, contained in a section of this title that refers to another section of
this title, does not, for the purpose of such reference, affect the meaning of a term used in such other
section").
is4See, e.g., supra notes 91 & 92 and accompanying text.
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sumed away.' 8 5 Only § 363(f)(3), which on its face only applies to liens, will
generally not be implicated.' 8 6 After identifying the proper ground that may
support the sale free and clear, the particular interest at issue must be examined as must the applicable nonbankruptcy law regarding sales free and
clear or the legal or equitable proceedings in which a benefitted party may be
forced to accept a monetary satisfaction of the interest.
Concerns regarding the necessity of the sale free and clear, the harm to
the interest holder, or constitutional claims of a "taking" can be addressed
through the mechanisms of adequate protection in the case of a nonplan
§ 363(o sale and the "fair and equitable" cramdown standard in the case of
vesting free and clear under a plan of reorganization and § 1141(c). If the
debtor cannot design a mechanism to satisfy these requirements, the sale free
187
and clear or plan confirmation will be denied.
Courts should also recognize the possibility of eminent domain as a hypothetical proceeding that may satisfy the condition set out in § 363(0(5)188
Doing so will focus the parties and the bankruptcy court on the compensatory and Constitutionally-mandated nature of adequate protection. 8 9 Further, explicitly evaluating the sale free and clear process with reference to a
Fifth Amendment taking will also focus all involved on the process that is
due to holders and potential holders of claims and interests.' 90
l'8-See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
1S6See § 363(0(3).
187§ 363(e). Holders of in rem property interests, unlike many potential successor liability claimants,
are often disclosed in public records or are otherwise intimately involved with the asset in question. As a
result, it is reasonable to assume that the more summary preplan sale procedure of § 363 can satisfy the
due process rights of those holding in rem interests although it may fall short for holders of successor
liability claims. See generally Kuney, Misinterpretations I, supra note 2 (discussing due process ramifications upon successor liability claimants when § 363 preplan sales rather than sales under confirmed plans
are used to reorganize a business through sale of substantially all its assets).
'8SSee supra notes 4 & 100 and accompanying text.
issSee supra notes 100, 163-68 and accompanying text.
" See Kuney, Misinterpretations I, supra note 1, at note 131 (discussing notice and due process
problems associated with § 363 motions and stating "Of course, notice to interested parties would need to
be adequate, a real issue in this context as those benefitted by an in rem interest may not otherwise appear
as creditors in the debtor's schedules or records although they would seem to have sufficient pre-sale
relationships with the debtor to satisfy the Piper test for determining where to cut off the debtor's right to
affect future claimants. Cf In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910 (discussing notice problem in
context of unknown claimants); see generally Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620 (10th
Cir 1984) (due process requires adequate notice to those whose rights are to be affected in the bankruptcy
proceeding). Further exacerbating the notice problem is the fast track process often used for § 363(f) sales.
They are usually merely contested matters and approval of the sale is sought by simple motion, see Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 4001, 6006, 9014, although in practice a twostep motion process is generally used: the first step
is to preliminarily approve the opening bid and procedures, the second to approve the final buyer. Ap,
proval can be obtained in as little as twenty days, and often is granted in no more than 60 or 90 days,
although this will vary with the size and complexity of the case and the degree of exigency of the "articu,
lated business justification- for the preplan sale under § 363(b). See FEo. R. BANKR. P. 4003(d); see also
supra note 30 (discussing the articulated business justification standard). If no objections are received, a
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Adopting this straightforward interpretation gives effect to the intent
behind §§ 363 and 1141 as enacted. Further, addressing attempts to sell free
and clear of in rem interests with the flexible standards of adequate protection and the fair and equitable cramdown standard and a principled application of nonbankruptcy law, including eminent domain concepts, will prevent
the development of bankruptcy-proof transactional structures using REAs,
CC&Rs, and conservation and environmental easements that may frustrate
later legitimate reorganizations. 19 1
CONCLUSION
This Article is laced with tensions. It recognizes that the dominant interpretations of § 363(0 remain inconsistent with its plain language as applied
to traditional in rem interests that run with the land. Attempts at sales free
and clear of these in rem interests are generally dismissed with too little analysis. Whether the fault of counsel who have inadequately briefed the matters
or judges who too readily accept the constraints of binding precedent or persuasive authority, none of these results are dictated by the language of the
statute. In the absence of courts revisiting and correcting these misinterpretations, transactional lawyers increasingly will use REAs and other forms of
traditional in rem interests that run with the land to structure and bankruptcy-proof transactions. To avoid a triumph of form over substance, courts
should carefully apply the statute and its standards and address the objections of parties benefitted by in rem interests that may be stripped off of
property through the flexible tools of adequate protection and the fair and
equitable cramdown standard. The alternative is to encourage formation of
rigid property-rights-based transactions that are, essentially, bankruptcyproof or, at least, very bankruptcy resistant.

hearing is not even necessary. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003; see also 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (2000) (defining

"notice and a hearing" as including no hearing at all absent objection or if time does not permit)"). Of
course, if personal jurisdiction is otherwise lacking in the main bankruptcy case over a party that the
363(f) sale seeks to impact, an adversary proceeding may need to be instituted in order to gain jurisdiction
over that entity in order to obtain effective relief. Because of the additional procedures required in adversary proceedings, this ameliorates, somewhat, the due process concerns of the otherwise potentially sum,
mary process. See, e.g.,
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001-7087 (rules governing adversary proceedings generally
parallel and incorporate by reference the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proceedure, making adversary proceedings largely resemble ordinary federal lawsuits in terms of practice and procedure, although some
methods of streamlining the process in adversary proceedings remain).
i9iSee supra notes 101-52 and accompanying text. That is, unless Congress revises the Bankruptcy
Code to provide for such bankruptcy proofing, which would be entirely proper. The point is that it

should be the legislature, not the courts, that make law of this fundamental sort.
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APPENDIX
A Non-Exclusive List of Laws of American Jurisdictions Permitting Termination or Modification of Easements and Covenants Under Theories Other
Than Eminent Domain and Summary Chart Summarizing Applicability
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EASEMENTS
Abandonment , Termination of an easement by abandonment requires an
act demonstrating intent of owner of dominant tenement to abandon. See
Chatham v. Blount County, 789 So. 2d 235, 241 (Ala. 2001) (Alabama); Swift
v. Kniffen, 796 P.2d 296, 303 (Alaska 1985) (Alaska); Bayless Inv. & Trading Co. v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 547 P.2d 1065, 1071 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1976) (Arizona); Bank of Fayetteville, N.A. v. Matilda's, Inc., 803
S.W.2d 549, 550 (Ark. 1991) (Arkansas); McCormick v. McNally, 220 P.2d
780, 781 (Cal. Ct. App.) (California); Upper Harmony Ditch Co. v. Carwin,
539 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Colo. 1975) (Colorado); Friedman v. Town of
Westport, 717 A.2d 797, 799 (Conn. 1998); PencaderAssociates, Inc. v. Glasgow Trust, 446 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Del. 1982) (Delaware); Kogod v. Cogito,
200 F.2d 743, 745 (D.C. 1953) (District of Columbia); Estate of Johnston v.
TPE Hotels, Inc., 719 So.2d 22, 26 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1998) (Florida);
Weaver v. Henry, 473 S.E.2d 495, 498 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (Georgia); Goo
Leong Shee v. Young Hung, 36 Haw. 132, 141 (1942) (Hawaii); Perry v. Reynolds, 122 P.2d 508, 510 (Idaho 1942) (Idaho); Brunotte v. De Witt, 196 N.E.
489, 495 (Ill. 1935) (Illinois); Seymour Water Co. v. Lebline, 144 N.E. 30, 33
(Ind. 1924); Schwartz v. Grossman, 173 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Iowa 1969) (Iowa);
Miller v. St. Louis, Southwestern Ry. Co., 718 P.2d 610, 612 (Kan. 1986)
(Kansas); Jennings v. Dunn, 68 S.W.2d 13, 13 (Ky. 1934); Laird v. Board of
Com'rs of Fifth Levee Dist., 704 So.2d 404, 408 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (citing
LA CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 706, 753, 771, 773, 793, 794, 796, 798, 799) (Louisiana); Chase v. Eastman, 563 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Me. 1099) (Maine); Stewart
v. May, 85 A. 957, 960 (Md. 1912) (Maryland); Sindler v. William M. Bailey
Co., 204 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Mass. 1965) (Massachusetts); Jones v. Van
Bochove, 61 N.W. 342, 343 (Mich. 1894) (Michigan); United Parking Stations Inc. v. Calvary Temple, 101 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Minn. 1960) (Minnesota); Bivens v. Mobley, 724 So. 2d 458, 461 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998)
(Mississippi); Eureka Real Estate & Investmenht Co. v. Southern Real Estate
& Financial Co., 200 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Mo. 1947) (Missouri); Shammel v.
Vogt, 396 P.2d 103, 106 (Mont. 1964) (Montana); Hillary Corp. v. U.S. Cold
Storage, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 889, 900 (Neb. 1996) (Nebraska); City Motel, Inc.
v. State, 336 P.2d 375, 379 (Nev. 1959) (Nevada); Downing House Realty v.
Hampe, 497 A.2d 862, 864 (N.H. 1985) (New Hampshire); Nuzzi v. Corcione, 51 A.2d 357, 361 (N.J. Ch. 1947) (New Jersey); Sitterly v. Matthews, 2
P.3d 871, 877 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (New Mexico); DeCessare v. Feldmeier,
584 N.Y.S.2d 803, 803 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (New York); Moore v. Shore,
175 S.E. 117, 118 (N.C. 1934) (North Carolina); Harry E. McHugh, Inc. v.
Haley, 237 N.W. 835, 837, (N.D. 1931) (North Dakota); Snyder v. Monroe
Twp. Trustees, 674 N.E.2d 741, 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (Ohio); Kansas,
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0. & G. Ry. Co. v. Rogers, 191 P.2d 209, 211 (Okla. 1948) (Oklahoma);
Shields v. Villareal, 33 P.3d 1032, 1036 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (Oregon); Ruffalo v. Walters, 348 A.2d 740, 741 (Pa. 1975) (Pennsylvania); Jackvony v.
Poncelet,_ 584 A.2d 1112, 1114 (R.I. 1991) (Rhode Island); Immanuel Baptist
Church of North Augusta v. Barnes, 264 S.E.2d 142, 144 (S.C. 1980) (South
Carolina); Cleveland v. Tinaglia, 582 N.W.2d 720, 725 (S.D. 1998) (South
Dakota); Edminston Corp. v. Carpenter, 540 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1976) (Tennessee); Milligan v. Niebuhr, 990 S.W.2d 823, 826
(Tex.App.1999) (Texas); Dahnken v. George Romney & Sons Co., 184 P.2d
211, 215 (Utah 1947) (Utah); Nelson v. Bacon, 32 A.2d 140, 146 (Vt. 1943)
(Vermont); Hudson v. Pillow, 541 S.E.2d 556, 560 (Va. 2001) (Virginia);
Lawson v. State, 730 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Wash. 1986) (Washington); Walls v.
DeNoone, 550 S.E.2d 653, 657 (W. Va. 2001) (West Virginia); Burkman v.
City of New Lisbon, 19 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Wis. 1945) (Wisconsin); Carney v.
Board of County Cmm'rs of Sublette County, 757 P.2d 556, 562 (Wyo. 1988)
(Wyoming).
Change in Servient Tenement - When servient tenement is partially or
totally destroyed the dominant tenement's right to any easements may be
extinguished. See Pizitz-Smolian Co-op. Stores v. Randolph, 129 So. 26, 32
(Ala. 1930) (Alabama); Cohen v. Adolph Kutner Co., 171 P. 424, 424 (Cal.
1918) (California); Amlea (Florida),Inc. v. Smith, 567 So. 2d 981, 981 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (Florida); Farber v. State, 693 P.2d 469, 469 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1984); Shirley v. Crabb, 37 N.E. 130, 132 (Ind. 1894) (Indiana); Ballard
v. Butler, 30 Me. 94, 94 (1849) (Maine); Union Nat. Bank of Lowell v. Nesmith, 130 N.E. 251, 252 (Mass. 1921) (Massachusetts); Hasselbring v.
Koepke, 248 N.W. 869, 873 (Mich. 1933) (Michigan); Brect v. Johnson Hardware Co., 166 N.W. 1070, 1071 (Minn. 1918) (Minnesota); MONT. CODE.
ANN. § 70-17-111(2) (1947) (Montana); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-12 (2)
(1943) (North Dakota); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 60 § 59(2) (1994) (Oklahoma);
Rudderham v. Emery Bros., 125 A. 291, 292 (R.I. 1924) (Rhode Island).
End of Necessity/Cessation of Purpose - When an easement is created
by necessity or for a particular purpose, it is extinguished at the end of such
necessity or purpose. See Oyler v. Gilliland, 351 So. 2d 886, 887 (Ala. 1977)
(Alabama); Norken Corp. v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622, 631 (Alaska 1991)
(Alaska); Mettetal v. Stane, 227 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Ark. 1950) (Arkansas);
CAL.CIVIL CODE § 811(4) (1982) (California); Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn.
39, 41 (1842) (Connecticut); Whitfield v. Whittington, 99 A.2d 196, 198
(Del. Ch. 1953) (Delaware); Kogod v. Cogito, 200 F.2d 743, 745 (D.C. Cir.
1953) (District of Columbia); Russell v. Napier, 9 S.E. 746, 747 (Ga. 1889)
(Georgia); Cordwell v. Smith, 665 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983)
(Idaho); Oswald v. Wolf, 21 N.E. 839, 841 (Ill. 1889) (Illinois); Wilson v.
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Glasrock, 126 N.E. 231,233 (Ind. Ct. App. 1920) (Indiana); Chicago &N.W.
Ry. Co. v. Sioux City Stock Yards Co., 158 N.W. 769, 779 (Iowa 1916)
(Iowa); Dennis Long & Co. v. City of Louisville, 32 S.W. 271, 277 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1895) (Kentucky); Dallas v. Farrington, 490 So.2d 265, 271 (La. 1986)
(Louisiana); Whitehouse v. Cummings, 21 A. 743, 745 (Me. 1890) (Maine);
Condry v. Laurie, 41 A.2d 66, 68 (Md. 1945) (Maryland); Comeau v.
Manzelli, 182 N.E.2d 487, 492 (Mass. 1962) (Massachusetts); Feldman v.
Court, 146 N.W.2d 99, 101 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966) (Michigan); Thornton v.
McLeary, 137 So. 785, 786 (Miss. 1931) (Mississippi); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Silver King Oil &Gas Co., 127 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo. Ct. App.
1939) (Missouri); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 70-17-111(4) (1947) (Montana);
Badura v. Lyons, 23 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Neb. 1946) (Nebraska); Haserick v.
Boulia-Gorell Co., 88 A. 998, 999 (N.H. 1913) (New Hampshire); Adams v.
Cale, 137 A.2d 92, 100 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958) (New Jersey); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 70-3A,7 (1988) (New Mexico); Palmer v. Palmer, 44 N.E.
966, 967 (N.Y. 1896) (New York); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-12 (4) (1943)
(North Dakota); Waibel v. Schleppi, 62 N.E.2d 897, 898 (Ohio Ct. App.
1945) (Ohio); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 60 § 59(4) (1994) (Oklahoma); Rose v.
Denn, 213 P.2d 810, 812 (Or. 1950) (Oregon); Riefler & Sons v. Wayne
Storage Water Power Co., 81 A. 300, 301 (Pa. 1911) (Pennsylvania); 31 P.R.
LAWS ANN. § 1681 (1955) (Puerto Rico); Fusaro v. Varrecchione, 150 A.
462, 462 (R.I. 1930) (Rhode Island); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-13-13, 15-31 (Michie 1968) (South Dakota); McGiffin v. City of Gatlinburg,260 S.W.2d
152, 154 (Tenn. 1953) (Tennessee); Steele v. Ainsworth, 249 S.W.2d 656,
658 (Tex.Civ.App.1952) (Texas); Dahnken v. George Romney & Sons Co.,
184 P.2d 211, 216 (Utah 1947) (Utah); Reed v. Dent, 72 S.E.2d 255, 258
(Va. 1952) (Virginia); Lawson v. State, 730 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Wash. 1986)
(Washington); Millen v. Thomas, 550 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Wis. Ct. App.
1996) (Wisconsin).
Merger - When one person or entity owns both the dominant and servient
tenements, all easements are extinguished. See Stanley v. Barclay, 46 So. 2d
210, 212 (Ala. 1950) (Alabama); Palermo v. Allen, 369 P.2d 906, 911 (Ariz.
1962) (Arizona); Massee v. Schiller, 376 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Ark. 1964) (Arkansas); CAL.CIVIL CODE § 811(1) (1982) (California); Scott v. Powers, 342
P. 2d 664, 666 (Colo. 1959) (Colorado); Robinson v. Hillman 36 App.D.C.
241, 241 (D.C. Cir 1911) (District of Columbia); Tyler v. Price, 821 So.2d
1121, 1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (Florida); Wallace v. City of Atlanta,
184 S.E.2d 576, 577 (Ga. 1971) (Georgia); S. Utsunomiya Enterprises, Inc. v.
Moomuku Country Club, 866 P.2d 951, 968 (Hawaii 1994) (Hawaii); Davis
v. Gowen, 360 P.2d 403, 406 (Idaho 1961) (Idaho); Village of Lake Bluff v.
Dalitsch, 114 N.E.2d 654, 659 (Ill. 1953); Enderle v. Sharman, 422 N.E.2d
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686, 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (Indiana); Tamm, Inc. v. Pildis, 249 N.W.2d
823, 836 (Iowa 1976) (Iowa); Cameron v. Barton, 272 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky.
1954) (Kentucky); LA CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 776, 805, 3478 (1991); Smith v.
Dickson, 225 A.2d 631, 636 (Me. 1967) (Maine); Orfanos Contractors,Inc. v.
Schaefer, 582 A.2d 547, 552 (Md. App. 1990) (Maryland); Krinsky v. Hoff,
man, 95 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Mass. 1951) (Massachusetts); Von Meding v.
Strahl, 30 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Mich. 1948) (Michigan); Pergament v. Loring
Properties,Ltd., 599 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Minn. 1999) (Minnesota); Thornton
v. McLeary, 137 So. 785, 786 (Miss. 1931) (Mississippi); Johnston v. Bates,
778 S.W.2d 357, 362 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (Missouri); MONT. CODE. ANN.
§§ 70-17-105, 70-17-111(1) (1947) (Montana); Lackaff v. Bogue, 62 N.W.2d
889, 896 (Neb. 1954) (Nebraska); Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 918
P.2d 314, 318, 319 (Nev. 1996) (Nevada); D. Latchis, Inc. v. Borofsky Bros.,
Inc., 343 A.2d 637, 640 (N.H. 1975) (New Hampshire); Landy v. Cahn, 792
A.2d 544, 554 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (New Jersey); Beeman v.
Pawelek, 96 N.Y.S.2d 204, 221 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) (New York); Patrick v.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 97 S.E. 657, 661 (N.C. 1918) (North Carolina); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-12 (1) (1943) (North Dakota); Civilian De,
fense, Inc. V. Egan-Ryan Undertaking Co., 153 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1957) (Ohio); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 60 § 59(1) (1994) (Oklahoma);
Dressier v. Isaacs, 343 P.2d 714, 719 (Or. 1959) (Oregon); Obringer v. Minnotte Bros. Co, 42 A.2d 413, 414 (Pa. 1945) (Pennsylvania); 31 P.R. LAWS
ANN. § 1681(1) (1955) (Puerto Rico); Boorom v. Rau, 640 A.2d 963, 964
(R.I. 1994) (Rhode Island); Haselden v. Schein, 166 S.E. 634, 635 (S.C. 1932)
(South Carolina); Vanderbilt University v. Williams, 280 S.W. 689, 691
(Tenn. 1926) (Tennessee); Howell v. Estes, 12 S.W. 62, 62 (Tex. 1888)
(Texas); Bertolina v. Frates, 57 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1936) (Utah); Plimpton
v. Converse, 42 Vt. 712, 714 (Vt. 1870) (Vermont); Coast Storage Co. v.
Schwartz, 351 P.2d 520, 524 (Wash. 1960) (Washington); Pingley v. Pingley,
95 S.E. 860, 861 (W. Va. 1918) (West Virginia); Millen v. Thomas, 550
N.W.2d 134, 136 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (Wisconsin).
Prescription/Adverse Possession - An easement may be extinguished
by adverse use over a statutorily prescribed period of time. See Jesse French
Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 29 So. 683, 685 (Ala. 1901) (Alabama);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (Michie 1962) (Alaska); Sabino Town &. Country Estates Ass'n v.Carr, 920 P.2d 26, 29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (Arizona);
Fulcher v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 261 S.W. 645, 650 (Ark. 1924) (Arkansas); Sevier v. Locher, 272 Cal. Rptr. 287, 288 (1990) (California); Public
Storage, Inc. v. Eliot Street Ltd. Partnership,567 A.2d 389, 390 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1989) (Connecticut); Lickle v. Frank W. Diver, Inc., 238 A.2d 326, 329
(Del. 1968) (Delaware); Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 1990)
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(District of Columbia); Wiggins v. Lykes Bros., Inc., 97 So. 2d 273, 276 (Fla.
1957) (Florida); City of Savannah v. Barnes, 96 S.E. 625, 626 (Ga. 1918)
(Georgia); Suzuki v. Garvey, 39 Haw. 482, 486 (1952) (Hawaii); Winn v.
Eaton, 917 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (Idaho); Luthy v. Keehner,
412 N.E.2d 1091, 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (Illinois); PanhandleEastern Pipe
Line Co. v. Tishner, 699 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (Indiana);
Page v. Cooper, 53 N.W.2d 765, 767 (Iowa 1952) (Iowa); Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Wietharn, 787 P.2d 716, 723,724 (Kan. 1990) (Kansas); Angel v.
Rowette, 264 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Ky. 1954) (Kentucky); LA CIV. CODE ANN.
arts. 796-98 (1991) (Lousiana); Chevy Chase Land Co. V. U.S., 733 A.2d
1055, 1081 (Md. 1999) (Maryland); Brennan v. DeCosta, 511 N.E.2d 1110,
1111 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (Massachusetts); Hickerson v. Bender, 500
N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (Minnesota); Cummins v. Dumas,
113 So. 332, 333, 334 (Miss. 1927) (Mississippi); Frain v. Brda, 863 S.W.2d
17, 19-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (Missouri); Public Lands Access Ass'n Inc. v.
Boone and Crockett Club Foundation,Inc., 856 P.2d 525, 531-532 (Mont.
1993) (Montana); Brooks v. Jensen, 483 P.2d 650, 652 (Nev. 1971) (Nevada);
Titcomb v. Anthony, 492 A.2d 1373, 1375 (N.H. 1985) (New Hampshire);
Gera v. Szenzenstein, 21 A.2d 679, 680 (NJ. Ch. 1941) (New Jersey); Speigel
v. Ferraro, 541 N.E.2d 15, 16 (N.Y. 1989) (New York); McFayden v. Olive,
366 S.E.2d 544, 546 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (North Carolina); J.F. Gioia,Inc. v.
CardinalAmerican Corp., 491 N.E.2d 325, 333 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (Ohio);
Faulconer v. Williams, 964 P.2d 246, 250 (Or. 1998) (Oregon); Sabados v.
Kiraly, 393 A.2d 486, 490'(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (Pennsylvania); 31 P.R.
LAWs ANN. § 1681(2) (1955) (Puerto Rico); Thomas v. Ross, 477 A.2d 950,
953 (R.I. 1984) (Rhode Island); State v. Pettis, 41 S.C.L. (7 Rich.) 390, 391
(1854) (South Carolina); Kougl v.Curry, 44 N.W.2d 114, 118 (S.D. 1950)
(South Dakota); Shearer v. Vandergriff, 661 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tenn. 1983)
(Tennessee); City of Galveston v. Williams, 6 S.W. 860, 862 (Tex. 1888)
(Texas); Smith v. Benjamin, 30 V.I. 51 (1994) (Virgin Islands); Bertolina v.
Frates, 57 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1936) (Utah); Timney v. Worden, 417 A.2d
923, 925 (Vt. 1980) (Vermont); Beebe v. Swerda, 793 P.2d 442, 446 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1990) (Washington); Norman v. Belcher, 378 S.E.2d 446, 448 (W.
Va. 1989); Wis STAT. § 893.25 (1996) (Wisconsin); Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887
P.2d 500, 506 (Wyo. 1994) (Wyoming).
Innocent Purchaser - Generally, states with notice statutes consider all
easements extinguished when the servient tenement is purchased by a bona
fide purchaser without notice. See Johnston v. Harsh, 93 So. 451, 452 (Ala.
1922) (Alabama); Shalimar Ass'n v. D.O.C. Enterprises, Ltd., 688 P.2d 682,
691 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (Arizona); French v. Richardson, 438 W.W.2d
714, 714 (Ark. 1969) (Arkansas); Mesmer v. Uharriet, 174 Cal. 110, 116 (Cal.
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1916) (California); Hawley v. McCabe, 169 A. 192, 195 (Conn. 1933) (Connecticut); Rives v. Hickey, 1 MacArthur 83, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1873) (District of
Columbia); Wise v. Quina, 174 So. 2d 590, 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(Florida); Smith v. Parlier, 152 Ga. 100, 100 (1921) (Georgia); Clog Holdings,
N.V.v. Bailey, 992 P.2d 69, 80 (Hawaii 2000) (Hawaii); Jobling v. Tuttle, 89
P. 699, 703 (Kan. 1907) (Kansas); Phillips v. Parker,483 So. 2d 972, 975 (La.
1986) (Louisiana); Butler v. Haley Greystone Corp., 198 N.E.2d 635, 639
(Mass. 1964) (Massachusetts); Wolek v. Di Feo, 159 A.2d 127, 131 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (New Jersey); Corning v. Gould, 16 Wend. 530
(N.Y. 1837) (New York); Clark v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 135 S.E. 26, 27
(N.C. 1926) (North Carolina); Tiller v. Hinton, 482 N.E.2d 946, 953 (Ohio
1985) (Ohio); United States v. 127.03 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Wards
of Maleza Alta, 148 F.Supp. 904, 905 (P.R. 1957) (Puerto Rico); Beck v.
Northwestern R. Co. of South Carolina, 89 S.E. 1018, 1020 (S.C. 1916)
(South Carolina); Lesley v. City of Rule, 255 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. Ct. App.
1953) (Texas); Ricks v. Scott, 84 S.E. 676, 681 (Va. 1915) (Virginia); Roe v.
Walsh, 135 P. 1031, 1032 (Wash. 1913) (Washington); Taggert v. Warner, 53
N.W. 33, 34 (Wis. 1892) (Wisconsin).
Equity - The equitable doctrines, such as estoppel, may provide equitable
relief from excessively burdensome easements. See Bayless Inv. & Trading
Co. v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 547 P.2d 1065, 1074 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1976) (Arizona); Owners Assoc. of Foxcroft Woods, Inc. v. Foxglen Associates,
57 S.W.3d 187, 196 (Ark. 2001) (Arkansas); Romberg v. Slemon, 778 P. 2d
315, 318 (Colo. Ct. App.1989) (Colorado); Betley v. Gordy Const. Co., 115
A.2d 475, 478 (Del. Ch. 1955) (Delaware); McPherson v. Acker, 11 D.C. 150
(D.C. Cir. 1879) (District of Columbia); Wiggins v. Lykes Bros., Inc., 97 So.
2d 273, 275 (Fla. 1957) (Florida); Rolleston v. Sea Island Properties,Inc., 327
S.E.2d 489, 492 (Ga. 1985) (Georgia); Clog Holdings, N.V. v. Bailey, 992 P.2d
69, 79 (Hawaii 2000) (Hawaii); Winn v. Eaton, 917 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1996) (Idaho); Cox v. Colossal Cavern Co., 276 S.W. 540, 544 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1925) (Kentucky); Stickney v. City of Saco, 770 A.2d 592, 608 (Me.
2001) (Maine); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Lytle, 328 A.2d 69, 75 (Md. App.
1974) (Maryland); Boston, & P.R. Corp. v. Doherty, 28 N.E. 277, 278 (Mass.
1891) (Massachusetts); Longton v. Stedman, 148 N.W. 738, 741 (Mich.
1914) (Michigan); Davidson v. Kretz, 149 N.W. 652, 652 (Minn. 1914) (Minnesota); Velasco v. Goldman Builders, Inc., 225 A.2d 148, 155 (NJ. Super.
App. Div. 1966) (New Jersey); Luevano v. Maestras, 874 P.2d 788, 792
(N.M. 1994) (New Mexico); Coming v. Gould, 16 Wend. 530 (N.Y. 1837)
(New York); Baptist Church in Great Valley v. Urquhart, 178 A.2d 583, 587588 (Pa. 1962) (Pennsylvania); Nahabedianv. Jarcho,510 A.2d 425, 429 (R.I.
1986) (Rhode Island); Lague, Inc. v. Royea, 568 A.2d 357, 359 (Vt.1989)
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(Vermont); Harrisonet al. v. Miller,Exec., 21 S.E.2d 674, 675 (W. Va. 1942)
(West Virginia); Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 506 (Wyo. 1994)
(Wyoming).
Release - Voluntary release by the holder or holders of the easement over a
servient tenement can extinguish such an easement. See Westlake v. Silva,
121 P.2d 872, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (California); Durkee v. Jones, 60 P.
618, 620 (Colo. 1900) (Colorado); Richardson v. Tumbridge, 149 A. 241, 242

(Conn. 1930) (Connecticut); May v. Smith, 14 D.C. 55 (D.C. Cir. 1884) (District of Columbia); Sewell v. Burdine, 87 So. 143, 144 (Fla. 1921) (Florida);
Beloit Foundry Co. v. Ryan, 192 N.E.2d 384, 391 (Ill. 1963) (Illinois); Book v.
Hester, 695 N.E.2d 597, 600-601 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (Indiana); Helton v.
Jones, 402 S.W.2d 694, 696-97 (Ky. 1966) (Kentucky); LA CiV. CODE ANN.

art. 771 (1991) (Lousiana); Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Public Lands,
672 A.2d 91, 94 (Me. 1996) (Maine); Richards v. Attleborough Branch R.
Co., 26 N.E. 418, 419 (Mass. 1891) (Massachusetts); Flaten v. Moorehead
City, 59 N.W. 1044, 1044 (Minn. 1894) (Minnesota); Midella Enterprises,
Inc. v. Missouri State Highway Commission, 570 S.W. 2d 298, 300 n.1 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978) (Missouri); Sedillo Title Guaranty,Inc. v. Wagner, 457 P.2d
361, 364 (N.M. 1969) (New Mexico); Board of Educ., Rye Neck Union Free
School Dist. v. Ryewood Farms, Ltd., 533 N.Y.S.2d 998, 999 (1988) (New
York); Hine v. Blumenthal, 80 S.E.2d 458, 463-64 (N.C. 1954); Junction Ry.
Co. v. Ruggles, 7 Ohio St. 1, 3 (1857) (Ohio); Tusi v. Jacobsen, 134 Or. 505,
511 (1930) (Oregon); 31 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 1681(5) (1955) (Puerto Rico) La

Rue v. Greene County Bank, 166 SW2d 1044, 1048 (Tenn. 1942) (Tennessee); Cowan v. Gladder, 206 P. 923, 924 (Wash. 1922); Wausau Theatres Co.
v. Genrich, 29 N.W.2d 502, 503 (Wis. 1947).
Happening of a Condition - Deeds conveying express easements may
specify a condition upon the happening of which, the easement will terminate. See Brown v. McDavid, 676 P.2d 714, 718 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (Colorado); Eis v. Meyer, 555 A.2d 994, 996 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (Connecticut);
Shiner v. Baita, 710 So. 2d 711, 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Florida);
Akasu v. Power, 91 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Mass. 1950) (Massachusetts); Krieger v.
Cassis, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 326 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930) (Ohio); 31 P.R. LAWS
ANN. § 1681(4) (1955) (Puerto Rico); Shaw Industries v. Grizzell, 1995 WL
70570 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995) (Tennessee); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v.
Temple Northwestern Ry. Co., 170 S.W. 1073, 1075 (Tex. Ct. App.1914)
(Texas); Percival v. Williams, 74 A. 321, 324 (Vt. 1909) (Vermont); Zobrist
v. Culp, 627, P.2d 1308, 1311 (Wash. 1981) (Washington).
Misuse - When owner of the dominant tenement substantially and willfully
uses an easement in a way contrary to its enjoyment, it will be extinguished.
See CAL.CIVIL CODE § 811(3) (1982) (California); Paul v. Blakely, 51
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N.W.2d 405, 408 (Iowa 1952) (Iowa); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 70-17,111(3)
(1947) (Montana); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-12 (3) (1943) (North Dakota);
Young v. Thedieck, 8 Ohio App. 103 (1918) (Ohio); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 60
§ 59(3) (1994) (Oklahoma); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-13-12(3) (Michie
1968) (South Dakota); Stenz v. Mahoney, 89 N.W. 819, 820 (Wis. 1902)
(Wisconsin).
MISCELLANEOUS:
Ambiguity in Conveyance - Methonen v. Stone, 941 P.2d 1248, 1251
(Alaska 1997) (Alaska); Ross, Inc. v. Legler, 199 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ind. 1964)
(Indiana).
Death and Dissolution - KAN. STAT. ANN § 58-3811 (2001) (Kansas);
Thar v. Edwin N. Moran Revocable Trust, 905 P.2d 413, 414 (Wyo. 1995)
(Wyoming).
Tax Sale/ Foreclosure - In some cases, a tax or foreclosure sale will terminate an easement. Also, foreclosure under a mortgage or deed of trust recorded before the instrument creating the easement will extinguish the
easement and all subsequently created interests. See Wolfson v. Heins, 6 So.
2d 858, 861 (Fla. 1942) (Florida); IND. CODE § 6-1.1-25-4(d) (Supp. 1994)
(Indiana); Cousins v. Sperry, 139 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.Civ.App.1940, no writ)
(Texas); Saastopankkien Keskus-Osake Pankki (Skopbank) v. Allen-Williams
Corp., 7 F.Supp. 2d 601, 607 (V.I. 1998) (Virgin Islands).
Partition of Dominant Tenement - Partitioning of a dominant tenement that creates a greater burden on the servient tenement extinguishes the
easement. Alvey Development Corp. v. Mackelprang, 51 P.3d 45, 49 (Utah
2002) (Utah).
Noncompliance with Conditions Subsequent - An easement granted
by deed may be extinguished when it fails to comply with subsequent conditions. See Shaw Industries v. Grizzell, 1995 WL 70570 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995); St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Temple Northwestern Ry. Co. 170
S.W. 1073, 1075 (Tex. Ct. App.1914) (Texas).
Public Easements - These may only be terminated by the statutory procedures specified in 11 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 42-101 et. seq. (1994)
(Oklahoma).
Death of Grantor of Conservation Easement - A conservation easement shall be limited in duration to the lifetime of the grantor and may be
revoked at grantor's request. KAN.STAT. ANN § 58-3811 (2001) (Kansas).
COVENANTS
Public Policy - Generally, states will not enforce restrictive covenants that
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violate public policy. See Fugazzoto v. Brookwood One, 325 So.2d 161, 163
(Ala. 1976) (Alabama); Cawthon v. Anderson, 84 S.E.2d 66, 68 (Ga. 1954)
(Georgia); Hurd v. Hodge , 68 S.Ct. 847, 853 (U.S. 1948) (District of Columbia); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 (2002) (Illinois); Holliday v. Crooked Creek
Villages Homeowners Assoc., Inc., 759 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (Indiana); Flatt v. Flatt, 225 S.W. 1067, 1068 (Ky. Ct. App. 1920)
(Kentucky); Eisenstadt v. Barron, 250 A.2d 85, 87 (Md. 1969) (Maryland);
Hurwitz v. Summers Massachusetts Family LLC, 2002 WL 1923869
(Mass.Super. 2002) (Massachusetts); Terrien v. Zwit, 648 N.W.2d 602, 608
(Mich. .2002) (Michigan); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 28-2-703 (1947) (Montana); Toushah v. Staudinger, 604 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1993)
(New York); United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 370 S.E.2d 375, 380
(N.C. 1988) (North Carolina); Postiy v. Richards, Slip Copy Ohio App. (5
Dist. 2001) (Ohio); Capozzi v. Latsha & Capozzi, P.C., 797 A.2d 314, 317
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (Pennsylvania); Greene County Tire & Supply, Inc. V.
Spurlin, 338 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tenn. 1960) (Tennessee); Fine Foods, Inc. v.
Dahlin, 523 A.2d 1228, 1230 (Vt. 1986) (Vermont); Sussex Comty. Serv.
Ass'n v. Virginia Soc'y. for Mentally Retarded Children, Inc., 467 S.E.2d 468,
471 (Va.1996) (Virginia); Heyde Companies, Inc.. v. Dove Healthcare,LLC,
637 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (Wisconsin).
Estoppel - the equitable doctrine of estoppel can be applied to terminate
covenants running with the land in many states. See Lunn v. Tokeneke
Ass'n, Inc., 630 A.2d 1335, 1338 (Conn.1993) (Connecticut); Modisett v.
Jolly, 286 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (Indiana); Thodos v. Shirk,
79 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Iowa 1956) (Iowa); Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 464
A.2d 1104, 1109 (Md.App.1983) (Maryland); Cole v. Hadley, 39 N.E. 279,
280 (Mass. 1895) (Massachusetts); Harriganv. Mulcare, 22 N.W.2d 103, 105
(Mich. 1946) (Michigan); Beaver Lake Ass'n v. Sorensen, 434 N.W.2d 703,
706 (Neb. 1989) (Nebraska); Bridgewater v. Ocean City Ass'n, 96 A. 905, 907
(NJ. Ch. 1915) (New Jersey); White v. La Due & Fitch, 100 N.E.2d 167,
169-70 (N.Y. 1951) (New York); Tonge v. Item Pub. Co., 91 A. 229, 231 (Pa.
1914) (Pennsylvania); Marathon Finance Co. v. HHC Liquidation Corp., 483
S.E.2d 757, 767 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (South Carolina); Jones v. Haynes, 1998
WL 331311 (Tenn.App. 1998) (Tennessee); Wilhelm v. Beyersdorf, 100 Wn.
App. 836, 849 (Wash. 2000) (Washington); Harms v. Harms, 498 N.W.2d
229, 231 (Wis. 1993) (Wisconsin).
Waiver/Laches - When a restrictive covenant is not enforced, it may be
waived and therefore unenforceable. See Tubbs v. Brandon, 374 So.2d 1358,
1360 (Ala. 1979) (Alabama); Kalenka v. Taylor, 896 P.2d 222, 226 (Alaska
1995) (Alaska); Goforth v. Smith, 991 S.W.2d 579, 586 (Ark. 1999) (Arkansas); Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., 381 P.2d 13, 17 (Colo. 1963) (Colorado);
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Gage v. Schavior, 124 A. 535, 536 (Conn. 1924) (Connecticut); Entrepreneur,
Ltd. v. Yasuna, 498 A.2d 1151, 1155-56 (D.C. 1985) (District of Columbia);
Ortega Co. v.Justiss, 175 So. 2d 554, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (Florida);
GA CODE ANN. § 9-3-29 (1995) (Georgia); Ellis v. George Ryan Co., 424
N.E.2d 125, 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (Indiana); Thodos v. Shirk, 79 N.W.2d
733, 739 (Iowa 1956) (Iowa); N.P. Dodge Corp. v. Calderwood, 101 P.2d 883,
885 (Kan 1940) (Kansas); Hardesty v. Silver, 302 S.W.2d 578, 582 (Ky. 1957)
(Kentucky); LA CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 776,781 (1991) (Lousiana); Lane v.
Derocher, 360 A.2d 141, 142 (Me. 1976) (Maine); Schlosser v. Creamer, 284
A.2d 220, 223 (Md. 1971) (Maryland); Whitney v. Union R. Co., 77 Mass.
359, 361 (Mass. 1858) (Massachusetts); Gibbs v. Cass, 431 S.W.2d 662, 668
(Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (Missouri); Porterv. K & S Partnership,627 P.2d 836,
842 (Mont. 1981) (Montana); Varney v. Fletcher, 213 A.2d 905, 908 (N.H.
1965) (New Hampshire); Hoffman v. Perkins, 67 A.2d 210, 218-19 (N.J.
Super. Ch. 1949) (New Jersey); Flint v. Charham, 39 N.Y.S. 892, 894 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1896) (New York); Rodgerson v. Davis, 218 S.E.2d 471, 475 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1975) (North Carolina); Allen v. Mino Amusement Corp., 312
N.W.2d 698, 702 (N.D. 1981) (North Dakota); Russell v. Harpel, 10 Ohio
Cer. Dec. 732, 737 (1900) (Ohio); Parrish v. Flinn, 925 P.2d 89, 93 (Okl. Ct.
App. 1996) (Oklahoma); Hansell v. Downing, 17 Pa.Super. 235, 236 (1900)
(Pennsylvania); Rabon v. Mali, 344 S.E.2d 608, 610 (S.C. 1986) (South Carolina); Vaughn v. Eggleston, 334 N.W.2d 870, 873 (S.D. 1980) (South Dakota);
Indian Hills Club Homeowner's Assn., Inc. v. Cindy Cooper 1995 WL
763823 (Tenn.App. 1995) (Tennessee); Cox v. Melson-Fulsom, 956 S.W.2d
791, 794 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (Texas); Havensight Hills Estates Property
Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 1999 WL 317124 (Terr.V.I.,1999) (Virgin Islands); Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975) (Utah); Blanchard v. Stone, 15 Vt.
271 (1843) (Vermont); Wright v. Castles, 349 S.E.2d 125, 129 (Va. 1986)
(Virginia); Sandy Point Imp. Co. v. Huber, 613 P.2d 160, 162 (Wash. 1980)
(Washington); Ballard v. Kitchen, 36 S.E.2d 390, 394 (W. Va. 1945) (West
Virginia); Burden v. Doucette, 2 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Wis. 1942) (Wisconsin);
Keller v. Branton, 667 P.2d 650, 654 (Wyo. 1983) (Wyoming).
Change in Conditions - Often referred to as "change in character of neighborhood" this is the most common method of covenant termination and requires a severe change in the character of a neighborhood. See Johnson v. HJ.
Realty, 698 So. 2d 781, 784 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (Alabama); Shalimar Ass'n
v. D.O.C. Enterprises, Ltd., 688 P.2d 682, 691 (Ariz. Ct. App., 1984) (Arizona); Owens v. Camfield, 614 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) (Arkansas); Wedum-Aldahl Co. v. Miller, 64 P.2d 762, 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937)
(California); Zavislak v. Shipman, 362 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Colo. 1961) (Colo-
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rado); Shippan Point Ass'n, Inc. v. McManus, 641 A.2d 144, 146 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1994) (Connecticut); 1.77 Acres of Land v. State ex rel. State Highway Dept., 241 A.2d 513, 515 (Del. 1968) (Delaware); Mays v. Burgess, 152
F.2d 123, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Barton v. Moline Properties,164 So. 551, 555
(Fla. 1935) (Florida); Sandstrom v. Larsen, 59 Haw. 491, 498 (1978) (Hawaii); Ada County Highway Dist. By and Through Silva v. Magwire, 662
P.2d 237, 240 (Idaho 1983) (Idaho); Storke v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 61
N.E.2d 552, 556 (Ill. 1945) (Illinois); Hrisomalos v. Smith, 600 N.E.2d 1363,
1366 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (Indiana); Thodos v. Shirk, 79 N.W.2d 733, 739
(Iowa 1956) (Iowa); Hecht v. Stephens, 464 P.2d 258, 261-62 (Kan. 1970)
(Kansas); Goodwin Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 120 S.W.2d 1024, 1025 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1938) (Kentucky); LA CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 782 (1991) (Lousiana);
Bates Mfg. Co. v. Franklin Co., 218 A.2d 366, 368 (Me. 1966) (Maine); Adams v. Plaza Const Co., 145 A. 483, 484 (Md. 1929) (Maryland); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184 § 30 (West 1991) (Massachusetts); Gomah v.
Hally, 113 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Mich. 1962) (Michigan); Batinich v. Harvey,
277 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Minn. 1979) (Minnesota); Rose v. Houser, 206
S.W.2d 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947) (Missouri); Lund v. Orr, 148 N.W.2d 309,
310-11 (Neb. 1967) (Nebraska); Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski, 495 P.2d
624, 626 (Nev. 1972) (Nevada); Goldberg v. Al Tinson, Inc., 338 A.2d 556,
557 (N.H. 1975) (New Hampshire); Welitoff v. Kohl, 147 A. 390, 392 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. 1929) (New Jersey); Mason v. Farmer, 456 P.2d 187, 192
(N.M. 1969) (New Mexico); 111 Bloomingdale Realty Corp. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 383 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (New York); Medearis
v. Trustees of Meyers Park Baptist Church, 558 S.E.2d 199, 203 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2001) (North Carolina); Olberding v. Smith, 34 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1934) (Ohio); Thompson v. Rorschach, 416 P.2d 898, 901 (Okla.
1966) (Oklahoma); Ludgate v. Somerville, 256 P. 1043, 1045 (Or. 1927) (Oregon); Peoples-PittsburghTrust Co. v. Mckinley-Gregg Auto Co., 44 A.2d 295,
295 (Pa. 1945) (Pennsylvania); Assoc. v. Villa Caparrav. Catholic Church,
117 D.P.R. 346 (1986) (Puerto Rico); Duffy v. Mollo, 400 A.2d 263, 266 (R.I.
1979) (Rhode Island); Dunlap v. Beaty, 122 S.E.2d 9, 15 (S.C. 1961) (South
Carolina); Hyde v. Liebelt, 394 N.W.2d 888, 893 (S.D. 1986) (South Dakota);
Oliver v. Marbut, 123 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938) (Tennessee);
Meyerland Community Imp. Ass'n v. Temple, 700 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1985) (Texas); Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256, 1261 (Utah 1975) (Utah); Marks v.
Wingfield, 331 S.E.2d 463, 465 (Va. 1985) (Virginia); St. Luke's Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Hales, 534 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975)
(Washington); Carr v. Michael Motors, Inc., 557 S.E.2d 294, 299 (W. Va.
2001) (West Virginia); Burden v. Doucette, 2 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Wis. 1942)
(Wisconsin).
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Doctrines Applied to Easements - some states continue to refer to "servitudes" in general, which includes both covenants and easements, and thus
the methods applied to easements are applicable to covenants as well. See
Lost Creek Coal & Mineral Land Co. v. Hendon, 110 So. 308, 311 (Ala.
1926) (Alabama); CAL.CIVIL CODE § 811 (1982) (California); Hottell v.
Farmers' Protective Ass'n, 53 P. 327, 330 (Colo. 1898) (Colorado); S. Utsunomiya Enterprises, Inc. v. Moomuku Country Club, 866 P.2d 951, 968 (Hawaii 1994) (Hawaii); Sandstrom v. Larsen, 59 Haw. 491, 497 (1978)
(Hawaii); Watts v. Fritz, 194 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ill. 1963) (Illinois); Thodos v.
Shirk, 79 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Iowa 1956) (Iowa); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 7017-111 (1947) (Montana); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-12 (1943) (North Dakota); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 60 § 59 (1994) (Oklahoma); 31 P.R. LAWS ANN.
§ 1681 (1955) (Puerto Rico); Marathon Finance Co. v. HHC Liquidation
Corp., 483 S.E.2d 757, 762 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (South Carolina); S.D. CODI
FIED LAWS §§ 43-13-12 et seq. (Michie 1968) (South Dakota);
Release - Physical release of a restrictive covenant will void the covenant.
See Cappello v. Ciresi, 691 A.2d 42, 44 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996) (Connecticut); Thodos v. Shirk, 79 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Iowa 1956) (Iowa); LA CIv.
CODE ANN. arts. 780 (1991) (Lousiana); MarathonFinance Co. v. HHC Liquidation Corp., 483 S.E.2d 757, 761 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (South Carolina);
Albright v. Fish, 394 A.2d 1117, 1121 (Vt. 1978) (Vermont).
Statutory period - Some states have set statutory limits on the duration of
a covenant running with the land. See GA CODE ANN. § 29-301 (1995)
(Georgia); IowA CODE. ANN. § 614.24 (West 1998) (Iowa);
MINN.STAT.ANN. § 500.20 (West 2002) (Minnesota); Allen v. Sea Gate
Ass'n, Inc., 460 S.E.2d 197, 200 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (North Carolina).
Overbreadth/Ambiguity - Overbroad and ambiguous covenants are unenforceable. See Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 572 A.2d 510, 522
(Md.1990) (Maryland); Sullivan v. Kolb, 742 So.2d 771, 776 (Miss. Ct. App.
1999) (Mississippi).
MISCELLANEOUS
Failure to Create a Plan of Development - "That is important because
if no general plan of development exists, the general rule is that restrictive
covenants cannot be enforced." Constant v. Hodges, 730 S.W.2d 892, 894
(Ark. 1987) (Arkansas).
Original Title Invalid - If the covenantor has no title to the land, the
covenant can not run with the land. Martin v. Gordon, 24 Ga. 533, 536 (Ga.
1858) (Georgia).
Confusion - LA CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 783 (1991) (Lousiana) states that
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"Doubt as to the existence, validity, or extent of building restrictions is resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the immovable."
Failure to give notice to subsequent purchasers - Failure to meet
statutory requirements for filing a covenant renders the filing ineffective only
as to those without actual or constructive notice. NEB. Rev. STAT. § 76-238
(2001) (Nebraska).
No Further Purpose - When the purpose of a restriction is eliminated,
that restriction is extinguished. See Grossbaum v. Dil-Hill Realty Corp., 395
N.Y.S.2d 246, 247 (N.Y.App. Div. 1977) (New York).
Insufficient consideration - The court invalidated the restrictive covenant for failure of adequate consideration in Kistler v. O'Brien, 347 A.2d 311,
316 (Pa. 1975) (Pennsylvania).
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